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ARTICLES 
How Hard Can This Be? 
The Dearth of U.S. Tax Treaties with 
Latin America 
PATRICIA A. BROWN* 
The United States has fewer tax treaties with countries 
in Latin America and the Caribbean than the United King-
dom, France, Germany, Spain and even China have with 
such countries. After first describing ways in which tax trea-
ties reduce barriers to cross-border trade and investment, 
this Article considers in turn various possible explanations 
for this situation. It examines, and rejects, the hypothesis 
that Latin American countries are reluctant to enter into tax 
treaties in general. It then considers, and rejects, the possi-
bility that Latin American countries are opposed to in-
creased trade and investment from the United States in par-
ticular. It then considers the possibility that U.S. tax treaty 
policy presents insurmountable difficulties to the conclusion 
of tax treaties. It concludes that U.S. tax treaty policies may 
present obstacles to successful negotiations with some, but 
not all, Latin American countries, suggesting that the United 
States might make more progress by negotiating with some 
smaller countries if progress cannot be made with, for ex-
ample, Brazil or Argentina. 
                                                                                                             
 *   Patricia A. Brown is the Director of Graduate Programs in Taxation and 
Taxation of Cross-Border Investment at the University of Miami School of Law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has fifty-eight comprehensive bilateral tax 
treaties1 covering sixty-six countries. However, only five2 are with 
countries in Latin America or the Caribbean (“LATAM”).3 Tax trea-
ties have been described as “[t]he primary means for eliminating tax 
                                                                                                             
 1 See United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/united-states-in-
come-tax-treaties-a-to-z (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (listing all of the countries 
with which the United States has a tax treaty).  Nine of those countries (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan) are described as “former Soviet Republics which are now cov-
ered by the treaty with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), formerly 
known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” E.g., Belarus – Tax Treaty 
Documents, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/interna-
tional-businesses/belarus-tax-treaty-documents (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (ac-
counting for the discrepancy between the number of treaties and the number of 
countries covered). The site also includes links to several versions of the U.S. 
Model Income Tax Convention. United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, su-
pra. 
 2 See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of Trinidad and Tobago for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion, the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the 
Encouragement of International Trade and Investment, Trin. & Tobago-U.S., Jan. 
9, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047; Convention Between the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government of Jamaica for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income, Jam.-U.S., May 21, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 2865, T.I.A.S. No. 10,206; Con-
vention Between Barbados and the United States of America for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income, Barb.-U.S., Dec. 31, 1984, T.I.A.S. No. 11,090; Convention Between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Together with a Related Pro-
tocol, Mex.-U.S., Sep. 18, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-7 (1992) [hereinafter 
Mex.-U.S. Convention]; Convention Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect 
to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Venez., Jan. 25, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,020 
[hereinafter U.S.-Venez. Convention]. 
 3 The extension to the Netherlands Antilles of the Convention between the 
United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income and Certain Other Taxes was partially terminated, effective as of January 
1, 1988, except with respect to interest and related articles. Convention Between 
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barriers to trade and investment.”4 If the purpose of tax treaties is to 
eliminate tax barriers to cross-border trade and investment, one 
would expect the United States—one of the major investors in 
LATAM5—to have more tax treaties with countries in the region. 
This Article will explore the differences in tax treaty policy and 
other circumstances that have created this situation. 
Part I of this Article will describe, in general terms, the purpose 
of tax treaties. Part II will examine the possibility that LATAM 
countries are reluctant to enter into bilateral tax treaties. Part III will 
discuss U.S. policies that may prevent the conclusion of treaties with 
LATAM countries. Part IV will discuss several case studies regard-
ing both successful and less successful negotiations and how lessons 
drawn from these negotiations may inform future negotiations with 
LATAM treaty partners. This Article ends with some conclusions 
about the prospects for additional tax treaties between the United 
States and LATAM countries. 
I. WHY ARE BILATERAL TAX TREATIES NECESSARY? 
Tax treaties serve several purposes, including establishing 
thresholds for taxation, reducing withholding tax rates on residents 
                                                                                                             
the United States of America and the Netherlands with Respect to Taxes on In-
come and Certain Other Taxes, Neth.-U.S., Apr. 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1757; U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 9433, 8, at 162 (1988). The remaining articles were 
effectively terminated by the Protocol between the Government of the United 
State of America and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in re-
spect of the Netherlands Antilles Amending Article VIII of the 1948 Convention 
with respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes as Applicable to the 
Netherlands Antilles, subject to a grandfather clause that protected certain bonds 
that had been issued through Antilles subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Protocol 
Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Respect of the Netherlands Antilles Amend-
ing Article VIII of the 1948 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Certain Other Taxes as Applicable to the Netherlands Antilles, Neth.-U.S., Oct. 
10, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. No. 104-23 (1996). 
 4 Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 
6 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Treaties Hearing] (statement of Barbara M. Angus, 
International Tax Counsel of the United States Treasury).  
 5 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 
2019, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2019, at 48 (2019), https://unctad.org/en/Publi-
cationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf. 
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of the treaty countries so as to avoid “excessive” taxation, providing 
a treaty mechanism for relief of double taxation, and establishing 
some minimal protections against discriminatory treatment by one 
treaty party of residents or nationals of the other.6 
To a great extent, most modern tax treaties follow the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (“OECD 
Model”)7 or the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention 
between Developed and Developing Countries (“U.N. Model”),8  
which itself is based on the OECD Model. The distributive articles 
of the OECD Model—starting with Income from Immovable Prop-
erty in Article 6 and ending around Article 21 with Other Income—
establish a series of rules that may allow one country (frequently 
referred to as the “source” country, but sometimes the “host” or 
“paying” country) to tax a resident of the other country if certain 
thresholds are met.9 In some cases, the non-resident country is pro-
vided an unlimited right to tax.10 In other cases, the non-resident 
country is prohibited from taxing.11 And in others, the non-resident 
country is permitted to tax but at a specified maximum rate or only 
if certain thresholds are met regarding in-State activity.12 
In general, if the non-resident State is provided the right to tax, 
then the resident State is required to relieve double taxation.13 The 
OECD Model specifies two methods for relieving double taxation.14 
Under Article 23A, the resident State will exempt from taxation the 
                                                                                                             
 6 Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th 
Cong. 7–8 (2006) [hereinafter Tax Treaties Hearing] (statement of Patricia A. 
Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury). 
 7 OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL: CONDENSED 
VERSION, intro., para. 13 (2017) [hereinafter OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION]. 
 8 Dep’t of Econ. & Social Affairs, United Nations, Model Double Taxation 
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/213, at iii, ¶¶ 2, 18 (2017) [hereinafter U.N. Model Tax 
Convention].  
 9 OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 6–21. 
 10 Id. intro., ¶ 20. 
 11 Id.  
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. intro., ¶ 19. 
 14 Id.  
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income that may be taxed in the other State.15 Alternatively, a “Con-
tracting State” may choose the credit method of Article 23B, reduc-
ing the resident State tax dollar-for-dollar for the taxes paid to the 
other State.16 The OECD Model provides that even countries that 
generally use the exemption method for relieving double taxation 
may choose to retain their taxing rights with respect to items of in-
come taxed on a withholding basis by the source State, by using the 
credit method for withholding taxes.17 
Although the formal structure of these provisions is quite con-
sistent from treaty to treaty, the details can vary considerably.18 Cap-
ital importing countries, whether developed or developing, fre-
quently argue for higher withholding rates on dividends, interest, 
royalties, and so-called technical services19 than the capital export-
ing countries, which are required to relieve double taxation, would 
prefer.20 Countries that import goods and services may argue to ex-
pand taxing rights by adopting different thresholds for taxation.21 
To the extent that these goals are achieved by limiting the source 
country’s right to tax, they can be affected through standardized pro-
visions that are more or less the same across the more than three 
thousand bilateral tax treaties currently in force around the world.22 
However, in order to effectively mesh one country’s tax system with 
                                                                                                             
 15 Id. art. 23A, ¶ 1. Article 23A allows for “exemption with progression” so 
that the marginal rate applicable to other non-exempt income takes into account 
the exempt income. Id. art. 23A, ¶ 3; see also id. cmt. 9. For example, Individual 
X earns $100 from business activities in Country S and $100 from business activ-
ities in Country R, his State of residence. The marginal tax rate in Country R is 
20% for the first $150 of income, but 30% for income in excess of $150. Under 
the Country S-Country R tax treaty, Country R must exempt the $100 earned in 
Country S from taxation, but it may apply the 30% rate to $50 of Individual X’s 
income. 
 16 Id. art. 23B, ¶ 1. 
 17 Id. art. 23A, ¶ 2; see also id., cmt. ¶ 47. 
 18 See Martin Hearson, Measuring Tax Treaty Negotiation Outcomes: The 
Action Aid Tax Treaties Dataset 10–11 (Int’l Ctr. for Tax & Dev., Working Paper 
No. 47, 2016). 
 19 U.N. Model Tax Convention, supra note 8, art. 12A. 
 20 See Hearson, supra note 18, at 9, 11. 
 21 Compare, e.g., OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 5, 7 
(providing more limited taxing rights), with U.N. Model Tax Convention, supra 
note 8, arts. 5, 7 (providing more expansive taxing rights). 
 22 Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41 BROOKLYN J. INT'L 
L. 973, 975 (2016). 
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another, so as to avoid double taxation23 and double non-taxation24 
and to achieve the agreed-upon allocation of tax revenues, treaty ne-
gotiators must frequently modify the taxation of their own residents 
through more customized provisions that deviate not only from the 
standardized treaty provisions, but also from their own domestic tax 
laws.25 
One of the most common ways in which U.S. treaties modify the 
treatment of U.S. residents in order to alleviate double taxation is by 
modifying source rules, which otherwise can limit the foreign tax 
credit available under U.S. domestic law.26 A version included in 
many U.S. treaties provides that, if the treaty allows the other Con-
tracting State to tax an item of gross income, as defined under U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 23 See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of 
America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.K.-U.S., at 286–
87, July, 24, 2001, 2224 U.N.T.S. 247 [hereinafter U.K.-U.S. Convention) (ad-
dressing conflicts between the grantor trust rules of the United States and the set-
tlor trust rules of the United Kingdom). 
 24 See, e.g., Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art. 18, Neth.-
Bel., June 5, 2001, 2205 U.N.T.S. 385 (allowing the source State to tax pension 
income if the residence State does not tax such income fully). 
 25 See Income Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the H.R. Subcomm. on Oversight 
of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 115 (1980) [hereinafter Income 
Tax Treaties] (statement of H. David Rosenbloom, Treasury International Tax 
Counsel, Department of the Treasury) (“The code paints a broad picture for use 
with all countries. The treaties, as I see it, provide the necessary refinement on a 
country-by-country basis. I don’t think it is possible as a statutory matter to ad-
dress all the multitude of tax systems that we encounter throughout the world.”). 
Many of these customized provisions are found in treaties with the United States’ 
most important treaty partners—the United Kingdom and Canada—because the 
sheer volume of trade and investment highlights problems relatively quickly and 
creates a significant incentive to solve them. See, e.g., U.K.-U.S. Convention, su-
pra note 23; Convention Between the United States of America and Canada With 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Can.-U.S., art. XXI, Sept. 26, 1980, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11087 [hereinafter Can.-U.S. Convention]. 
 26 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE 
UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOV. 15, 2006, at 74 
(2006), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Docu-
ments/hp16802.pdf; see also H. David Rosenbloom, U.S. Source Rules: Building 
Blocks of Cross-Border Taxation, 60 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 386, 386–87 (2006). 
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law, derived by a resident of the U.S, the U.S. will treat that item of 
gross income as gross income from sources within the other Con-
tracting State for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes.27 This provision 
is intended to ensure that a U.S. resident can obtain a U.S. foreign 
tax credit for taxes paid to the other Contracting State when the 
treaty assigns primary taxing rights over an item of gross income to 
that State.28 
The importance of re-sourcing rules has occasionally been over-
looked.29 However, the lack of such rules can frustrate the intentions 
of the treaty negotiators. For example, Article 5(5) of the 1992 tax 
treaty between the United States and Mexico provides that a foreign 
enterprise could be taxed in the host country if a person in the host 
country “habitually processes in the first-mentioned State on behalf 
of the enterprise goods or merchandise maintained in that State by 
that enterprise, provided that such processing is carried on using as-
sets furnished, directly or indirectly, by that enterprise or any asso-
ciated enterprise.”30 The rule would allow Mexico to treat U.S. com-
panies that use Mexican assembly plants (“maquiladoras”)31 as hav-
ing permanent establishments in Mexico.32 However, under U.S. do-
                                                                                                             
 27 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX 
CONVENTION, art. 23 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION]. 
 28 See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE 
PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON 
CAPITAL GAINS 97–98 (2003), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-pol-
icy/treaties/Documents/teus-uk.pdf (discussing paragraph 2 of article 24 of the 
Convention). 
 29 See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 26, at 389–90. 
 30 Mex.-U.S. Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 5. 
 31 See James F. Smith & Chris Kraul, U.S., Mexico Reach Deal on Factory 
Tax, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1999, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/ar-
chives/la-xpm-1999-oct-30-mn-27797-story.html. 
 32 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITED MEXICAN STATES FOR 
THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL 
EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME 10 (1994), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/mexicotech.pdf (discussing Paragraph 5 of Arti-
cle 5 of the Convention; “This subparagraph is meant to clarify that a dependent 
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mestic rules, income earned through those permanent establish-
ments would have been treated as U.S.-source income, potentially 
exposing the companies to double taxation.33 Article 24(3) of the 
Mexico-U.S. treaty was modified in 2002 to ensure that the United 
States would provide relief from double taxation if Mexico taxed a 
U.S. company in accordance with Article 5(5) of the treaty.34 
The U.S.-Venezuela treaty dealt with similar issues with source 
rules.35 At the time of the treaty negotiations, Venezuela had a ter-
ritorial system under which it taxed residents and non-residents only 
on income arising from sources in Venezuela.36 Because Venezuela 
could tax only income from sources within Venezuela, there was an 
obvious incentive for them to take a broad view of what constituted 
Venezuelan-source income.37 That resulted, for example, in Vene-
zuela imposing withholding taxes on payments for certain services 
performed by U.S. persons in the United States.38 Under U.S. do-
mestic law, the income earned from services performed in the 
United States is from U.S. sources.39 U.S. foreign tax credit limita-
tions are intended to ensure that foreign taxes do not reduce U.S. 
taxation on U.S. source income.40 Accordingly, unless the recipient 
of such income also had low-taxed foreign source income from other 
                                                                                                             
agent that processes inventory of its principal using assets of the principal (or a 
related enterprise) without itself having ownership of either the inventory or the 
assets used in the processing, represents a permanent establishment of the princi-
pal. This is the case whether or not the dependent agent is a subsidiary of the U.S. 
enterprise. Because such an agent represents a permanent establishment, the in-
come and assets attributable to its activity are subject to income and assets tax in 
Mexico.”). 
 33 See Smith & Kraul, supra note 31. 
 34 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL 
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES 15 (2002), https://www.treas-
ury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/temexico.pdf. 
 35 See JESSE HELMS, S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TAX CONVENTION 
WITH VENEZUELA, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-6, at 9 (1999), https://www.con-
gress.gov/106/crpt/erpt6/CRPT-106erpt6.pdf. 
 36 See id. at 8 (discussing the “Venezuelan Territorial Tax System”). 
 37 Id. at 9–10. 
 38 Id. at 9. 
 39 See id. 
 40 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 514, FOREIGN TAX CREDIT FOR 
INDIVIDUALS, at 3 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p514.pdf [hereinafter 
PUB. 514] (discussing the U.S. foreign tax credit). 
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activities, those U.S. taxpayers could have been subject to double 
taxation with respect to amounts received from Venezuela.41 A 
treaty can prevent double taxation in that case by providing that 
Venezuela cannot tax income from “business profits” of the service 
provider unless that service provider has a “permanent establish-
ment” in Venezuela.42 
Another area where domestic law may be too blunt an instru-
ment is in the treatment of pensions. The OECD Model provides that 
pensions should be taxable in the state of residence of the recipient 
of the pension.43 For example, Individual R has worked all his life 
for a company that is a resident of Australia, during which he con-
tributed to the company’s defined contribution retirement plan. Aus-
tralia taxes pensions under a “TTE” system—there is no tax deduc-
tion or exemption when contributions are made (“T”), the invest-
ment income of the fund is taxed (“T”) (albeit at a concessionary 
rate) and distributions from the fund to the beneficiary are not taxed 
at all (“E”).44 Individual R would like to retire to the United States 
where his children and grandchildren are living. However, the 
United States generally taxes pensions under an EET system, pursu-
ant to which contributions to a pension fund are deductible (“E”), 
investment income of the pension fund is not taxable (“E”), but dis-
tributions are taxed (“T”).45 If Individual R moved to the United 
States, he would be subject to the equivalent of double taxation be-
cause he would have been taxed in Australia, either on the value of 
the contributions made by his employer or on the full value of his 
compensation without deduction for contributions Individual R 
                                                                                                             
 41 See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-6, at 9. 
 42 See id. at 22. Alternatively, a treaty could provide for a source State taxing 
right, but also include a re-sourcing rule for any gross income taxed by the source 
State. See id. at 55. 
 43 OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 18. 
 44 See OECD PROJECT ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVES & RETIREMENT SAVINGS, 
THE TAX TREATMENT OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 1–2 
(2018), https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/Tax-treatment-of-retire-
ment-savings-Policy-Brief-1.pdf; see also Rhys Cormick & John A. McLaren, 
The Current Retirement System in Australia Needs to be More Attuned to a Mobile 
International Workforce: A Case for Reform, 29 AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM 493, 
499–500 (2014). 
 45 McLaren, supra note 44, at 499–501. 
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made, and taxed a second time in the United States on the distribu-
tions received from the pension fund.46 In this case, the tax treaty 
between Australia and the United States does not include a provision 
that would prevent the United States from taxing any pension to the 
extent that it would be exempt in the other country.47 
The provisions implicated in the preceding examples in this Sec-
tion are some of those that affect trade in goods and services, as op-
posed to investment. Early tax treaties were primarily about ensur-
ing the appropriate allocation of profits from business activities, par-
ticularly when defunct empires begat newly-independent coun-
tries.48 Businesses selling goods into, or providing services in, an-
other country rely on Articles 5 and 7 of the OECD Model, which 
generally provide that the business profits of an enterprise may be 
subject to taxation in the host State only when the business has a 
“permanent establishment” in that State.49 Article 8 prevents a host 
State from taxing profits that arise from the operation of ships or 
aircraft in international traffic, even if the relevant enterprise has a 
permanent establishment in the host State.50 The “closed system”51 
of taxing income from employment is found in Articles 15 through 
19.52 The rule that ensures that business executives attending meet-
ings in another State are not subject to tax therein is in Article 
15(2).53 Articles 9 and 25 provide principles for the allocation of 
                                                                                                             
 46 Cf. id. (discussing taxation on pensions in Australia and the United States). 
 47 Compare Convention Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Australia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Austl.-
U.S., arts. 18–19, Aug. 6, 1982, 35 U.S.T. 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 10,773, with U.S. 
MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 17(1)(b). 
 48 See Convention for the Purpose of Avoiding Double Taxation Between 
Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Roumania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes, art. 2–4, April 6, 1922, reprinted in LEAGUE OF NATIONS, DOUBLE 
TAXATION AND FISCAL EVASION: COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
AND INTERNAL LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOUBLE TAXATION 
AND FISCAL EVASION 73, 73–74 (1928). 
 49 See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 5, 7. 
 50 See id., art. 8. 
 51 See Frank P.G. Pötgens, The “Closed System” of the Provisions on Income 
from Employment in the OECD Model, 41 EUROPEAN TAX’N 252, 252 (2001). 
 52 OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 15–19. 
 53 Id., art. 15, ¶ 2. 
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income between jurisdictions and a mechanism to resolve disagree-
ments between the countries over such allocations.54 
Article 5, in its current form, allows an enterprise to sell into a 
jurisdiction without becoming subject to taxation there, unless the 
enterprise has a physical presence there or a person in the host juris-
diction with the authority to bind the enterprise.55 Even if the enter-
prise has a physical presence or person with binding authority in the 
host State, it will still not be subject to taxation in that State if its 
activities in the host State fall within a category of “preparatory or 
auxiliary” activities.56 Treaties based on the U.N. Model expand 
these rules somewhat, particularly to deal with the provision of ser-
vices.57 Nevertheless, millions of cross-border transactions take 
place every day under the protection of these provisions.58 
Imagine a world in which airlines and shipping companies were 
subject to taxation in every jurisdiction in which they landed or 
docked. The allocation of income between hundreds of jurisdictions 
would be difficult, to say the least. For that reason, agreements allo-
cating taxation rights only to the State of residence or otherwise 
denying taxing rights to the host State were entered into as early as 
the 1920s.59 Some might argue that the existence of such agreements 
obviates the need for tax treaties with respect to transportation ac-
tivities. However, such agreements do not resolve all the issues aris-
ing from the operation of such enterprises in multiple jurisdictions.  
For example, such enterprises may engage in activities beyond those 
                                                                                                             
 54 Id., arts. 9, 25. 
 55 Id., art. 5, ¶¶ 1–2, 4–6. 
 56 Id., art. 5, ¶ 4. 
 57 See, e.g., U.N. Model Tax Convention, supra note 8, art. 5, cmt. ¶ 9. 
 58 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD WORK ON TAXATION 
14 (2018), https://www.oecd.org/tax/centre-for-tax-policy-and-administration-
brochure.pdf (“Today [the OECD Model] forms the basis of a network of around 
3,000 tax treaties globally, reducing the tax barriers to cross-border trade and in-
vestment, as well as assisting in the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion.”). 
 59 See, e.g., Double Taxation: Shipping Profits, Swed.-U.S., Aug. 9, 1922, 11 
Stat. 746; Reciprocal Exemption from Taxation of Air Transport Profits, U.K.-
Neth., Aug. 27, 1936, http://foto.archivalware.co.uk/data/Library2/pdf/1936-
TS0026.pdf. 
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exempted under domestic law or such limited shipping agree-
ments.60 Tax treaties may provide a broader exemption for such ac-
tivities. 
Even if such enterprises are not subject to taxation on their own 
profits in the host State, the situation may be different with respect 
to the enterprises’ employees.61 If the employees are subject to tax 
in the host State, the employer may have withholding obligations.62 
In 2005, the trade association representing Latin American airlines 
complained that the U.S. Internal Revenue Service was auditing the 
airlines with respect to their flight crews’ income allocable to the 
United States that exceeded the exemptions provided in U.S. domes-
tic law.63 The version of Article 14 included in the U.S. Model In-
come Tax Convention would have prevented U.S. taxation of such 
flight crew members if they were residents of countries with which 
the United States had tax treaties.64 
Some of these problems may be obvious from the beginning of 
discussions between potential treaty partners, while others may be-
come clear during negotiations, and some only appear once the 
treaty relationship is established. The United States and Canada, for 
                                                                                                             
 60 For example, section 883 of the Internal Revenue Code applies to foreign 
corporations that are “considered engaged in the international operation of ships 
or aircraft.” I.R.C. § 883-1(c)(1) (2018). On the other hand, the U.S. Model Arti-
cle. 8(3) applies to stand-alone container leasing companies.  See DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE 
AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION 
WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS 32 (2002), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/teus-
uk.pdf (noting, in respect to Article 8(3), that “[t]his result obtains under para-
graph 3 regardless of whether the recipient of the income is engaged in the oper-
ation of ships or aircraft in international traffic . . . .”). 
 61 See, e.g., Caroline Daniel, Airlines Fear U.S. Income Tax Claim, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at 7 (discussing how the IRS claims Latin Amer-
ican airlines may owe taxes for employees when flying over and conducting pre-
flight services in the United States). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 14. 
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example, have entered into five protocols to the 1980 tax treaty be-
tween the two countries.65 Having a treaty relationship already in 
place allows for the resolution of emerging issues more quickly.66 
Because the rules affecting trade are generally more standard-
ized, more attention tends to be focused on the withholding rates 
applicable to dividends, interest, and royalties, which affect cross-
border investment.67 In particular, multinational corporations gener-
ally are concerned about the “excessive” taxation that they may suf-
fer because source countries impose gross-basis withholding 
taxes.68 A representative of U.S.-based multinationals testified: 
In addition, the tax systems of most countries impose 
withholding taxes, frequently at high rates, on pay-
ments of dividends, interest, and royalties to foreign-
ers, and treaties are the mechanism by which these 
taxes are lowered on a bilateral basis. If U.S. enter-
prises earning such income abroad cannot enjoy the 
reduced foreign withholding rates offered by a tax 
treaty, they are liable to suffer excessive and non-
creditable levels of foreign tax and to be at a compet-
itive disadvantage relative to traders and investors 
from other countries that do have such benefits. Tax 
treaties serve to prevent this barrier to U.S. participa-
tion in international commerce.69  
Those sentiments were echoed by a representative of foreign-
based multinationals with U.S. subsidiaries: 
                                                                                                             
 65 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America 
and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Can.-U.S., at V–
VI, Sept. 21, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. No. 110-15 (2008) (listing the prior protocols 
to the agreement). 
 66 See Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at 3 (statement of Patricia A. 
Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Department of 
the Treasury). 
 67 See The Japanese Tax Treaty (T. Doc. 108-14) and the Sri Lanka Tax Pro-
tocol (T. Doc. 108-9): Hearing Before the S, Comm. of Foreign Relations, 108 
Cong. 31 (2004) (statement of Barbara M. Angus, International Tax Counsel, 
United States Department of the Treasury). 
 68 See id. at 32. 
 69 Id. (statement of William A. Reinsch, President, National Foreign Trade 
Council). 
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Tax treaties help ensure that businesses are not taxed 
twice on the same income while accounting for con-
cerns of tax avoidance. This is done in part by reduc-
ing or eliminating withholding taxes on cross-border 
income flows between affiliated companies. By en-
suring that common business expenses like royalty 
and interest payments are not subject to double taxa-
tion, tax treaties allow insourcing companies to in-
vest more in the very business activities that drive 
economic growth in the United States.70 
A potential treaty partner that has shown a willingness to reduce 
withholding taxes in its negotiations with other countries is, there-
fore, much more likely to succeed at convincing the United States 
to enter into tax treaty negotiations than one that has not. 
II. ARE LATAM COUNTRIES RELUCTANT TO ENTER INTO TAX 
TREATIES? 
There is a pervasive narrative that tax treaties are one-sided in-
struments of economic oppression foisted upon developing coun-
tries by developed countries.71 Developing countries are urged to 
decline to enter into tax treaties because (a) they are not necessary 
to avoid double taxation and (b) they simply result in revenue trans-
fers from developing countries to developed countries.72 It is neces-
sary, therefore, to consider whether the lack of tax treaties between 
the United States and LATAM countries is attributable to a general 
reluctance on the part of LATAM countries to enter into tax treaties. 
                                                                                                             
 70 Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 
(2014) [hereinafter 2014 Treaties Hearing] (statement of Nancy L. McLernon, 
President & CEO Organization for International Investment), https://www.for-
eign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/022614AM_Hearing_Testimony%20-
%20Nancy_McLernon.pdf. 
 71 Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939, 
990–93 (2000). 
 72 See id. at 990–91. 
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In 2009, Sebastien Drevet and Victor Thuronyi compared the 
treaty networks of UN member states with those of OECD mem-
bers.73 They found that the average number of tax treaties entered 
into by OECD members was seventy-two, while the average number 
of tax treaties entered into by non-OECD members was seventeen.74 
At the time, the LATAM country with the highest number of tax 
treaties was Mexico, ranked fifty-fifth (tied with Armenia and Vi-
etnam) with thirty-seven treaties.75 Next was Brazil, ranked seventy-
third with twenty-eight treaties.76 Barbados was seventy-fourth with 
twenty-six.77 Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago were tied at eight-
ieth (with Algeria and Bosnia and Herzegovina) with twenty-four 
treaties each.78 Jamaica was eighty-fifth and Chile was eighty-
sixth.79 At the time, Chile had twenty treaties and Argentina had 
seventeen treaties.80 Below the non-OECD member average were 
Ecuador (14), Antigua and Barbuda (12), Guyana (12), St. Kitts and 
Nevis (12), Dominica (12), St. Lucia (11), St. Vincent and the Gren-
adines (11), Bolivia (9), Cuba (7), Peru (5), Colombia (4), Uruguay 
(2), the Dominican Republic (1), Panama (1), Paraguay (1), and Su-
riname (1).81 The Bahamas, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua were all listed as having no tax treaties.82 
Drevet and Thuronyi compiled their tables using the tax treaty 
database of the IBFD.83 The database shows that, over the past dec-
ade, the number of treaties entered into by LATAM countries has 
increased, in some cases significantly. Mexico now has sixty tax 
treaties.84  Chile now has thirty-three treaties, compared to twenty 
                                                                                                             
 73 See Sebastien A. Drevet & Victor Thuronyi, The Tax Treaty Network of 
the U.N. Member States, 54 TAX NOTES INT’L 783, 783–84 (2009). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 785. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 785–86. 
 82 Id. at 786. 
 83 Id. at 785–86. 
 84 Mexico - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Docu-
mentation (accessed Jan. 20, 2020). 
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in 2009.85 Uruguay has twenty-one, compared to its previous two.86 
Colombia has treaty relationships with twelve countries, more than 
twice its prior four.87 Peru has treaty relationships with ten coun-
tries, an increase from its previous five.88 Ecuador has twenty, an 
increase of six.89 Brazil increased the number of its treaties to thirty-
three from twenty-eight.90 Argentina added three.91 Bolivia contin-
ues to have nine.92 Accordingly, the data does not seem to support 
the idea of a general reluctance to enter into treaties as a significant 
reason for the lack of tax treaties with the United States. 
It is worth considering the treaty networks of these countries in 
more depth. In many cases, a large proportion of a country’s treaty 
network is made up of treaties with close neighbors and trading part-
                                                                                                             
 85 Compare Chile - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73, 
at 785. Chile currently has a treaty pending with the United States. See infra Sec-
tion IV.B.3. 
 86 Compare Uruguay - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fis-
cal Documentation (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 
73, at 785. In addition, Uruguay has four treaties that are currently pending. See 
Uruguay, DELOITTE INT’L TAX SOURCE, https://dits.deloitte.com/#Jurisdic-
tion/105 (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 87 Compare Colombia - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fis-
cal Documentation (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), and 2004 Andean Community In-
come and Capital Tax Convention, May 5, 2004, http://internationaltax-
treaty.com/download/bolivia/dtc/Andean%20Community-DTC-May-2004.pdf 
(creating a tax treaty relationship among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru), 
with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73, at 786. 
 88 Compare Peru - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73, 
at 786. 
 89 Compare Ecuador - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fis-
cal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 
73, at 786. 
 90 Compare Brazil - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73, 
at 785. 
 91 Compare Argentina - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fis-
cal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 
73, at 785. 
 92 Compare Bolivia - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73, 
at 786. 
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ners. Peru has treaty relationships with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, and Mexico.93 Its other treaties are with Canada, 
Korea, Portugal, and Switzerland.94 Peru’s primary trading partners 
are China, the United States, Brazil, Switzerland, Korea, Spain, 
Mexico, and India.95 In the case of Ecuador, seven of its twenty trea-
ties are with other LATAM countries—Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.96 Ecuador’s non-LATAM trea-
ties are with Belarus, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
Italy, Korea, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Spain, and Swit-
zerland.97 Ecuador’s primary export trading partners are the United 
States, Vietnam, Peru, Chile, Panama, Russia, and China.98 Its pri-
mary import trading partners are the United States, China, Colom-
bia, Panama, Brazil, and Peru.99 Other treaties appear to be with 
countries that are likely sources of investment capital.100 
It appears that a reasonable number of LATAM countries are 
open to tax treaty negotiations and adept at choosing treaty partners 
that are likely sources of trade or investment. LATAM countries are, 
therefore, investing scarce negotiation resources on potential treaty 
                                                                                                             
 93 Peru - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, supra note 88. 
 94 Id. 
 95 World Factbook: Peru CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2020) (listing Peru’s import and export partners under “economy” 
tab). 
 96 Ecuador - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, supra note 89. 
 97 Id. 
 98 World Factbook: Ecuador, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2020) (listing Ecuador’s export partners under “economy” tab). 
 99 Id. (listing Ecuador’s import partners). 
 100 See, e.g., Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, As of End-2018: 
Reporting Economy: Germany, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regu-
lar.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (listing Germany as having 
invested $348 million in Ecuador); see also Ecuador, FRANCE DIPLOMATIE: 
MINISTRY FOR EUROPE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS, https://www.diplo-
matie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/ecuador/ (last updated June 6, 2017) (“with a stock 
of about US $500 million, France has positioned itself as the third-largest Euro-
pean investor over the past 15 years . . . .”). 
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partners from which they are likely to see the most benefit. It is sur-
prising, therefore, that the United States is not part of the treaty net-
work in those countries.101 
There does not seem to be any desire to rebuff trade and invest-
ment from the United States. Nine LATAM countries—Argentina, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Uruguay—have entered into Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (“BITs”) with the United States.102 BITs are intended “to 
protect private investment, to develop market-oriented policies in 
partner countries, and to promote U.S. exports.”103 The United 
States also has Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) in place with a 
number of LATAM countries.104 FTAs generally include the inves-
tor-protection provisions of BITs, along with additional provisions 
regarding trade in goods and services.105 LATAM countries that are 
party to an FTA with the United States are Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru.106 Income taxes generally 
are carved out of the trade disciplines imposed by BITs and FTAs, 
the thought being that income taxes should be covered by tax treaties 
                                                                                                             
 101 United States - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020) (listing treaties only with those LATAM 
countries listed in note 2, supra). 
 102 See Bilateral Investment Treaties Currently in Force, ENF’T & 
COMPLIANCE, TRADE COMPLIANCE CTR., https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agree-
ments/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/index.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2019). 
 103 Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
 104 See Free Trade Agreements, ENF’T & COMPLIANCE, TRADE COMPLIANCE 
CTR., https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Free_Trade_Agreements/in-
dex.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2019). 
 105 Compare United States – Chile Free Trade Agreement ch. 10, June 6, 2003, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_up-
load_file1_4004.pdf, with the OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 
U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (2012), https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. 
 106 Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Dec. 26, 
2019) (listing all countries the United States has free trade agreements with). 
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and not trade agreements.107 The problem is that the tax treaties have 
not materialized. 
III. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON NEW TAX TREATIES. 
A. Economic Factors Affecting U.S. Tax Treaty Policy 
The United States has a long history with income tax treaties, 
having entered into comprehensive treaties with France108 and Swe-
den109 as long ago as the 1930s. U.S. tax treaty policy historically 
reflects a general institutional interest in having an open economy 
that favors cross-border trade and investment.110 To the layperson, 
“[t]ax treaties are important to the overall international economic 
policy of the United States because they serve to reduce tax barriers 
to international trade and investment.”111 
Although the United States is a capital-importing country,112 it 
is a net aggregate capital-exporter of foreign direct investment 
                                                                                                             
 107 See Hugh J. Ault & Jacques Sasseville, Taxation and Non-Discrimination: 
A Reconsideration, 22 WORLD TAX J. 101, 119 (2010). 
 108 See Convention and Protocol Between the United States of America and 
France, Fr.-U.S., Apr. 27, 1932, 49. Stat. 1345. 
 109 See Convention and Protocol Between the United States of America and 
Sweden Respecting Double Taxation, U.S.-Swed., Mar. 23, 1939, 54 Stat. 1759. 
 110 Conventions and Protocols on Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Pre-
vention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital; Treaty 
Doc. 103-29, Sweden; Treaty Doc. 103-30, Ukraine; Treaty Doc. 103-31, Mexico; 
Treaty Doc. 103-32, France; Treaty Doc. 103-33, Kazakhstan; Treaty Doc. 103-
34, Portugal; Treaty Doc. 104-4, Canada: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign 
Relations U.S. S., 104th Cong. 114 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Hearing] (statement 
of Alan P. Larson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs) (“There is reason to believe that tax policy and tax treaties are be-
coming more important elements of our international economic infrastructure. As 
the pace of globalization intensifies and formal barriers to trade and investment 
recede, tax treatment becomes an even greater factor in making trade and invest-
ment decisions.”). 
 111 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Secretary John W. Snow 
Remarks at the US-Japan Income Tax Treaty Signing Ceremony (Nov. 6, 2003), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js975.aspx. 
 112 Steven Rattner, Unpacking the Trade Deficit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/opinion/unpacking-the-trade-deficit.html 
(“[C]apital can also be imported to make up for a lagging savings rate and even 
to finance consumption. With the domestic savings rate low (in part because of a 
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(“FDI”).113 Portfolio debt, primarily corporate and government 
bonds held by foreign investors, does not rely on treaty claims to 
provide exemptions from U.S. withholding tax.114 However, treaties 
are generally necessary to provide exemptions from withholding tax 
for related party debt and reductions or exemptions from withhold-
ing tax on dividends and royalties.115 As of the end of 2017, the total 
amount of foreign direct investment into the United States was just 
over $4 trillion, $3.3 trillion of which was equity investment.116 U.S. 
outward foreign direct investment was just over $6 trillion, with $5.8 
trillion as equity.117 A significant amount of South American invest-
ment in United States in particular consists of real property,118 which 
also is not affected by tax treaties as treaties generally allow unlim-
ited taxation by the State of source.119 Accordingly, with respect to 
the income that tax treaties apply to, income flows generally favor 
the United States. 
                                                                                                             
federal budget deficit about to eclipse $1 trillion), we have — in most recent years 
— been net borrowers.”). 
 113 Compare Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: 
Reporting Economy: United States, INT’L MONETARY FUND, data.imf.org/regu-
lar.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-o: 
United States], with Table 1-i: Inward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-
2017: Reporting Economy: United States, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [hereinafter 
Table 1-i: United States]. 
 114 See I.R.C. § 871(h), 881(c) (2018). 
 115 See id. § 882(c)(3); see also Jefferey L. Rubinger, Proposed U.S. Model 
Treaty  Provisions May Dramatically Alter International Tax Landscape, 89 FLA. 
B.J. 54, 54 (2015). 
 116 See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113. 
 117 See Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113. 
 118 According to the National Association of Realtors, LATAM accounted for 
22% of foreign purchases of U.S. residential real estate in 2019, second only to 
Asia and Oceania at 27%. LAWRENCE YUN & GAY CORORATON, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
RELATORS, PROFILE OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN U.S. RESIDENTIAL 
REAL ESTATE 14 (2019), https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/2019-profile-of-international-activity-in-u-s-residential-real-estate-07-17-
2019.pdf. 
 119 See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 6 
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Because payment flows generally favor the United States,120 the 
goal has been to reduce withholding taxes and other source taxation 
as much as possible.121 However, because it is not always possible 
to achieve everything desired in a negotiation, the priorities with re-
spect to reductions of withholding taxes have been royalties, inter-
est, and dividends.122 
There are a number of reasons for the focus on eliminating 
source-State taxation of royalties. The theoretical justification is that 
royalties are generated by marketing or industrial intangibles, which 
require substantial expenditures, either for research and develop-
ment, in the case of industrial intangibles, or advertising and mar-
keting, in the case of marketing intangibles.123 Accordingly, royal-
ties are more like business profits than a passive investment, such as 
dividends or interest.124 Perhaps even more important is the practical 
reason that the United States encountered frequent disputes with 
treaty partners over the definition of royalties and the source of roy-
alties.125 Eliminating the withholding tax on royalties seems to have 
                                                                                                             
 120 See Matthew Higgins & Thomas Klitgaard, Income Flows from U.S. For-
eign Assets and Liabilities, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Nov. 14, 2012), https://liber-
tystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/11/income-flows-from-us-foreign-as-
sets-and-liabilities.html. 
 121 See Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Patricia A. 
Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Department of 
the Treasury). 
 122 See U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, arts. 10–12; see also 
see also Pamela A. Fuller, The Japan-U.S. Income Tax Treaty: Signaling New 
Norms, Inspiring Reforms, or Just Tweaking Anachronisms in International Tax 
Policy?, 40 INT’L LAW. 773, 794 (2006) (“The U.S. Government’s objectives for 
withholding rates, as reflected in the U.S. Model Tax Treaty, are zero percent on 
royalties and most categories of interest, and 5 percent on dividends received by 
corporate shareholders holding directly at least 10 percent of voting stock of the 
payor.”). 
 123 See Fuller, supra note 122, at 794–95. 
 124 See id. at 796 (discussing the difficulty in distinguishing royalties from 
business profits). 
 125 See id. at 795. 
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eliminated those disputes.126 Finally, the United States exports in-
tangibles;127 royalty flows always favor the United States.128 
Ideally, the United States would also like to eliminate all with-
holding taxes on interest, subject to certain anti-abuse rules.129 If it 
cannot do so, the fallback position is to eliminate or at least reduce 
the gross-basis taxation of types of interest that would constitute 
business profits, such as interest received by financial institutions.130 
The United States also tries to eliminate withholding taxes on in-
vestment income earned by tax-exempt pension funds because such 
taxes inevitably result in economic double taxation.131 
The U.S. position with respect to dividends changed about 
twenty years ago.132 Prior to that, the United States position was to 
follow the OECD Model on dividends, providing for a five percent 
direct dividend rate133 and a fifteen percent portfolio dividend 
rate.134 The Treasury Department only reconsidered this position in 
                                                                                                             
 126 See id. at 794–95 
 127 See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 44 (2007) (“The place 
of use rule is favorable to the source country which may be surprising because the 
United States is a net exporter of intangible property”); Mariano Municoy, Allo-
cation of Jurisdiction on Patent Disputes in the Models Developed by Hague Con-
ference in Private International Law: Asymmetric Countries and the Relation-
ships of Private Parties, 4 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 342, 376–77 (2005). 
 128 OLENA DUDAR ET. AL., CTR. FOR EUROPEAN ECON. RES., THE IMPACT OF 
TAXES ON BILATERAL ROYALTY FLOWS 2 (2015). 
 129 See U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 11 ¶1; Fuller, supra 
note 122, at 797–99; Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at 4, 10 (statement of 
Patricia A. Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. De-
partment of the Treasury). 
 130 See Fuller, supra note 122, at 797; Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at 
13 (statement of Patricia Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Af-
fairs), U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
 131 OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 18 cmt. ¶ 69. 
 132 See generally ROBERT H. DILWORTH ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
LLP, ZERO WITHHOLDING ON DIRECT DIVIDENDS: POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR A 
NEW U.S. TREATY MODEL 1113–31 (2000) (arguing for the U.S. to change its po-
sition with respect to dividends). 
 133 The United States preferred to apply the direct dividend rate at a ten percent 
ownership threshold rather than the twenty-five percent threshold in the OECD 
Model. Compare U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 10, with 
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 10. 
 134 U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 10, ¶ 2; see also 
DILWORTH ET AL., supra note 132. 
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order to conclude an agreement with the United Kingdom.135 At the 
time, the United Kingdom was in the process of reforming its cor-
porate tax system, including through the repeal of its advance cor-
poration tax (“ACT”).136 The corporate reform would have two ma-
jor effects with respect to the United States. First, the ACT served 
to prevent treaty-shopping into the United States through U.K. com-
panies, as the ACT was to be paid even if a U.K. company had no 
mainstream corporate tax liability (for example, because the com-
pany could use foreign tax credits from foreign investment to offset 
the U.K. corporate tax liability).137 Second, the United States agreed 
in 1975 to a complicated treaty provision that provided certain ben-
efits to U.S. shareholders with respect to the U.K.’s imputation sys-
tem for taxing corporate profits.138 This provision, criticized by 
Charles Kingson in his article “The Coherence of International Tax-
ation” as effectively a tax-sparing provision,139 by 1999 required the 
U.S. to provide a foreign tax credit for a tax that never was paid.140 
Accordingly, the United States wanted several things out of the re-
                                                                                                             
 135 RICHARD LUGAR, TAX CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, S. 
EXEC. RPT. NO. 108-2, at 5 (2003). 
 136 See id. at 7 (discussing the repeal of ACT by the U.K. and the effect on 
treaty negotiations between the U.S. and U.K.). 
 137 See Shawn Carson & Richard Blum, Changes to the U.K. Partial Imputa-
tion System, 20 INT’L TAX J. 47, 51–52 (1993) (describing how reliefs in the form 
of foreign tax credits can be used to reduce the mainstream corporate tax). 
 138 Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, U.K.-U.S., arts. 10, 23, Dec. 31, 
1975, 31 U.S.T. 5668. 
 139 Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1151, 1215 (1981). 
 140 See Rev. Proc. 2000-13, § 3.02, 2000-1 C.B. 515 (“A portfolio investor 
making this election will be treated as having received an additional dividend 
equal to the gross amount of the tax credit (unreduced by amounts withheld), and 
as having paid the withholding tax due under Article 10, on the date of the distri-
bution. Thus, the investor must include in income the gross payment deemed re-
ceived, and may claim a foreign tax credit under Article 23 for the withholding 
tax treated as paid to the United Kingdom.”); see also S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-2, 
at 7 (“However, in order to account for the recent repeal of the U.K. advance 
corporation tax and related developments, the proposed treaty also eliminates a 
provision of the present treaty requiring the United States to provide a foreign tax 
credit with respect to certain dividends received from U.K. companies.”). 
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negotiation of the tax treaty;141 the U.K. wanted just one—the elim-
ination of the withholding tax on dividends paid by subsidiaries to 
their parent companies.142 
The Treasury essentially concluded that there is no single “right” 
rate when it comes to dividends.143 This realization allows negotia-
tors to be very pragmatic in terms of dealing with other countries. In 
addition, because the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention continued 
to follow the OECD version of Article 10 with respect to the basic 
treatment of direct and portfolio dividends,144 the United States ef-
fectively acquired a new bargaining chip to be used in negotiations, 
as other countries asked the United States to go to zero.145 Although 
it took some time to figure out why, it appears that governments 
were influenced by their multinational corporations.146 For many of 
those multinationals, the United States is the most important foreign 
market.147 On the other hand, while U.S. companies favor zero div-
idends generally, no foreign market is as important to them as the 
United States is to other countries.148 
By making this concession, the United States was able to 
achieve a number of important goals over the next few years. In the 
U.S.-U.K. Treaty, the United States was able to achieve a modern 
treaty with a “limitation on benefits” provision,149 override of the 
                                                                                                             
 141 See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-2, at 6–8 (discussing the benefits the U.S. would 
receive from giving the U.K. a zero-withholding rate). 
 142 See id. at 5–8 (discussing the benefits of the treaty for the U.K.). 
 143 See id. at 8 (discussing how the zero-rate provision must be looked at on a 
case-by-case basis before deciding on a proper rate for each future U.S. tax treaty). 
 144 Compare U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 10, with 
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 10. 
 145 See Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at 3 (statement of Patricia A. 
Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Department of 
the Treasury) (“The provision dealing with inter-company dividends was very im-
portant to Sweden.”). 
 146 Cf. DILWORTH ET AL., supra note 132 (discussing how dividend rates allow 
for multinational companies to be more competitive in the U.S. and foreign mar-
kets). 
 147 See Kingson, supra note 139, at 1172 (“[T]he United States has recently 
become the ‘favorite site’ for investments from other industrialized coun-
tries . . .”). 
 148 See id. 
 149 Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for 
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domestic tax interest requirement in the information exchange arti-
cle,150 an anti-conduit rule applicable in particular to the waiver of 
the insurance excise tax,151 and a resolution of a dispute over the 
proper way to allocate interest expense to permanent establishments 
of foreign financial institutions.152 
In exchange for the elimination of withholding taxes on inter-
company dividends, Australia agreed to unprecedented reductions 
in the withholding tax rates on interest and royalties,153 which was 
followed by Japan agreeing to reductions in withholding taxes on 
interest and the elimination of the withholding tax on royalties.154 
The Netherlands, whose treaty with the United States already elim-
inated the withholding taxes on interest and royalties,155 agreed to a 
new limitation on benefits provision that included anti-inversion 
                                                                                                             
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.K.-U.S., art. 23, July 24, 2001, 
T.I.A.S. No. 13,161. 
 150 See id. art. 27. 
 151 Id. art. 7, ¶ 5. 
 152 Exchange of Letters Between the United Kingdom and United States, Con-
vention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect 
to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.K.-U.S., July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 
13,161. 
 153 Tax Convention with the United Kingdom (T. Doc. 107-10) and Protocols 
Amending Tax Conventions with Australia (T. Doc. 107-20) and Mexico (T. Doc. 
108-3): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 21 
(2003) (statement of David Noren, Legislation Counsel, Joint Committee on Tax-
ation). 
 154 The Japanese Tax Treaty (T. Doc. 108-14) and the Sri Lanka Tax Protocol 
(T. Doc. 108-9): Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 
4 (2004) (statement of Barbara M. Angus, International Tax Counsel, United 
States Department of the Treasury). 
 155 See Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of 
America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Tax-
ation and the Prevention of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, 
Neth.-U.S., art. 10, Mar. 8, 2004, S. TREATY DOC. No. 108-25; see also 2004 
Treaties Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Barbara M. Angus, International 
Tax Counsel, United States Department of the Treasury). 
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rules.156 And Belgium overrode its bank secrecy rules.157 Although 
this run of treaty re-negotiations no doubt provided significant ben-
efits to the United States, it also meant that few resources were avail-
able to expand the U.S. tax treaty network. 
B. Political Factors Affecting U.S. Tax Treaty Policy 
Tax treaties receive very little attention in the U.S. mainstream 
press, particularly as compared to trade agreements, which are much 
more controversial.158 Tax treaties have also been negotiated by 
both Democratic and Republican administrations in roughly equal 
numbers.159 If there is a difference between political parties, it is 
largely a matter of nuance. 
Traditionally, Republican administrations have placed an em-
phasis on the benefits of globalization, trade, and investment.160 In 
an effort to make U.S. multinationals more “competitive,” their do-
mestic tax policy has focused on providing lower corporate rates and 
exempting foreign business profits from U.S. taxation.161 In the tax 
treaty context, this translates to reducing source country taxation by 
lowering or eliminating gross-basis withholding taxes on passive in-
come and maintaining high thresholds for taxation of business in-
come. Anti-treaty-shopping provisions, primarily the U.S. limitation 
on benefits provision, are therefore intended to create leverage to 
lower withholding rates. After many years, Canada’s agreement to 
                                                                                                             
 156 2004 Treaties Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Barbara M. Angus, 
International Tax Counsel, United States Department of the Treasury). 
 157 Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 
5 (2007) (statement of John Harrington, International Tax Counsel, Department 
of the Treasury) (explaining the strengthening of the information exchange article 
requiring Belgium to provide the U.S. with bank information). 
 158 See generally Patrick Driessen, Is There a Tax Treaty Insularity Complex? 
TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L 745, 745–54 (May 28, 2012). 
 159 See Jason R. Connery et al., Current Status of U.S. Tax Treaties and Inter-
national Tax Agreements, TAX MGMT. INT’L J. (Nov. 29, 2019), 
https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2019/update-us-treaties-status-
tmij.pdf (listing the dates U.S. tax treaties were entered into). 
 160 See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2016 REPUBLICATION PARTY PLATFORM 
2 (2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/docu-
ments/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf. 
 161 See id. 
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accept the elimination of source-country withholding taxes on inter-
est162 can be seen as a validation of this policy. 
On the other hand, Democratic administrations have shown 
more concern about the dangers of globalization.163 Democrats have 
been much more concerned about tax arbitrage and tax evasion.164 
In the treaty context, these foci are reflected not so much in the terms 
of agreements, which are fairly consistent with prior practice, but in 
treaty negotiating priorities. For example, the Clinton Administra-
tion was very focused on re-negotiating old treaties to expand infor-
mation exchange on request and update anti-treaty-shopping provi-
sions.165 The Obama Administration produced the 2016 U.S. Model 
Income Tax Convention,166 which was more focused on the risk of 
double non-taxation than prior U.S. model treaties or actual U.S. tax 
treaties.167 The 2016 Model Income Tax Convention includes a 
number of provisions, including rules on “special tax regimes,” that 
                                                                                                             
 162 Protocol Amending 1980 Tax Convention with Canada with Respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital, Can.-U.S., art. 6, Sep. 21, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. 
No. 110-15 (2008) [hereinafter Protocol with Canada] (amending Article 11 of 
the Convention). 
 163 See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 12 
(2016), https://democrats.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf. 
 164 See id. 
 165 See Bilateral Tax Treaties and Protocol: Estonia–Treaty Doc. 105-55; Lat-
via–Treaty Doc. 105-57; Venezuela–Treaty Doc. 106-3; Denmark–Treaty Doc. 
106-12; Lithuania–Treaty Doc. 105-56; Slovenia–Treaty Doc. 106-9; Italy–
Treaty Doc. 106-11; Germany–Treaty Doc. 106-13: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 9, 16 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Bilateral Tax 
Treaties and Protocol] (statement of Philip R. West, International Tax Counsel, 
Department of the Treasury). 
 166 See generally U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27. 
 167 Compare Preamble to the U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, 
(“The Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
__________, intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination of double 
taxation with respect to taxes on income without creating opportunities for non-
taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through 
treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this Conven-
tion for the indirect benefit of residents of third states), have agreed as follows”), 
with Preamble to DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX 
CONVENTION (2006) (“The Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of  -----, desiring to conclude a Convention for the avoidance of dou-
ble taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, 
have agreed as follows”). 
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are aimed at flattening corporate structures by reducing the utility of 
intermediary companies.168 However, these provisions have not 
been included in any signed U.S. tax treaty.169 Treasury officials 
have indicated that they are developing a new U.S. Model.170 How-
ever, it remains unclear which of these provisions will be included 
in that Model. 
The Trump Administration’s international tax policy is a mix of 
traditional Republican and Democratic policy goals. As in past Re-
publican administrations, there is a stated goal of making U.S. mul-
tinationals more “competitive,” by lowering rates and exempting 
(some) foreign business profits.171 However, an emphasis on repat-
riation of intangible property, profits, and runaway plants172 is more 
                                                                                                             
 168 For a general description of the provisions of the 2016 U.S. Model, see 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Full Circle? The Single Tax Principle, BEPS and the New 
U.S. Model, GLOBAL TAX'N, May 2016, at 12, 17–20 (2016); U.S. MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION, supra note 27, arts. 3, 10, 11, 12, 12, 21 and 28. 
 169 The most recent tax treaty signed by the United States is a proposed treaty 
with Vietnam, which was signed in 2015.  See Connery et al., supra note 159, at 
4.  It does not include the rules on “special tax regimes,” “expatriated entities” or 
“subsequent changes in law.”  See Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income arts. 3, 10, 11, 12 and 21, Viet.-U.S., July 7, 
2015, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Docu-
ments/Treaty-Vietnam-7-7-2015.pdf [hereinafter Viet.-U.S. Treaty].  
 170 Letter from David Kautter, Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury (Tax Policy), 
Dep’t of the Treasury to Robert Menendez, U.S. Sen. (June 12, 2019) [hereinafter 
Letter from Kautter to Menendez]. 
 171 See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., supra note 160, at 2. 
 172 See Press Release, Treasury Dep’t, Unified Framework for Fixing Our Bro-
ken Tax Code (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-re-
leases/Documents/Tax-Framework.pdf (press release from the Treasury Depart-
ment and Congressional Republicans laying out goals for tax reform, including 
“[e]nding incentives to ship jobs, capital, and tax revenue overseas”); Press Re-
lease, U.S. Congressman Lloyd Doggett, Whitehouse, Doggett Call for Action on 
Tax Haven Bill in Wake of Paradise Papers (Nov. 7, 2017), https://dog-
gett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/whitehouse-doggett-call-action-tax-
haven-bill-wake-paradise-papers (describing proposed legislation that “would 
limit the ways corporations can game the U.S. tax system by moving jobs and 
assets abroad.”). 
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consistent with past Democratic concerns, as is a focus on base ero-
sion and tax arbitrage.173 There is a continued desire to discourage 
inversions while encouraging foreign investment in the United 
States.174  
Because no tax treaty has been signed during the Trump Ad-
ministration,175 any discussion of tax treaty policy is mostly conjec-
ture.  In the absence of newly-signed agreements, the best indication 
of the Trump Administration’s view may be the fact that it actively 
supported the tax agreements that were pending before the Senate 
when President Trump took office.176 Those agreements were con-
sistent with U.S. tax treaty policy as developed over many years.  
                                                                                                             
 173 Compare U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE PROPOSALS 144–46 (1998), https://www.treas-
ury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-
FY1999.pdf (explaining the Clinton Administration’s proposal to “address tax 
avoidance through use of hybrids”), with Certain Related Party Amounts Paid or 
Accrued in Hybrid Transactions or with Hybrid Entities  26 U.S.C. § 267A (2018) 
(enacted in 2017 as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 115-97). 
 174 CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE 
TAXATION: THE 2017 REVISION (P.L. 115-97), at 29 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45186.pdf. 
 175 The last bilateral tax treaty signed by the United States was with Vietnam 
on July 7, 2015. See Connery et al., supra note 159, at 4. The United States has 
not signed the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, which first opened for sig-
nature on June 6, 2017. See Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention 
to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf (last up-
dated Jan. 23, 2020).  
 176 Because U.S. tax treaty policy has been relatively consistent over the years, 
it is generally the case that an incoming administration, even of a different party, 
supports tax treaties negotiated by prior administrations.  That is not a foregone 
conclusion, however. In 1981, the incoming Reagan Administration requested the 
return of treaties with the British Virgin Islands and Cyprus over concerns about 
treaty shopping. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, RETURN OF TWO TAX 
TREATIES, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 97-43, at 3 (1981). 
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Two of those agreements—protocols with Switzerland177 and Lux-
embourg178—primarily addressed information exchange for tax pur-
poses.179 The pending treaties with Hungary180 and Poland181 would 
add182 anti-treaty-shopping provisions, a goal of multiple admin-
istrations. Two protocols, with Japan183 and Spain,184 were updates 
of existing treaties with important treaty partners, resulting in im-
portant reductions in withholding rates.185 Only one agreement, with 
Chile, would represent a new tax treaty relationship.186 The Treas-
ury Department’s support for these agreements suggests that the 
Trump Administration’s tax treaty policy may be reasonably con-
ventional.  
                                                                                                             
 177 Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, Switz.-
U.S., Oct. 2, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 112-12 (2019). 
 178 Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Luxembourg, Lux.-U.S., May 
20, 2009, S. TREATY DOC. No. 111-8 (2019). 
 179  The protocols were approved by the Senate on July 17, 2019.  Id.; Protocol 
Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, supra note 177. They en-
tered into force on Sep. 20, 2019 and Sep. 9, 2019, respectively. See Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Welcomes Entry into Force of Tax Protocols 
with Luxembourg and Switzerland (Sep. 20, 2019), https://home.treas-
ury.gov/news/press-releases/sm781. 
 180 Tax Convention with Hungary, Hug.-U.S., Feb. 4, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. 
No. 111-7 (2017). 
 181 Tax Convention with Poland, Pol-U.S., Feb. 13, 2013, S. TREATY DOC. No. 
113-5 (2017). 
 182 These treaties have not yet been approved by the Senate, as discussed infra 
Section IV.B.3. See Annagabriella Colón, A Look Ahead: Prospects Unclear for 
U.S. Tax Treaties in 2020, TAX NOTES INT’L, Jan. 6, 2020, at 23, 23–24 
 183 Protocol Amending the Tax Convention with Japan, Japan-U.S., Jan. 24, 
2013, S. TREATY DOC. No. 114-1 (2019). 
 184 The Protocol Amending the Tax Convention with Spain, Spain-U.S., Jan. 
14, 2013, S. TREATY DOC. No. 113-4 (2019). 
 185 The protocol with Spain was approved by the Senate on July 16, 2019.  Id. 
The protocol with Japan was approved on July 17, 2019.  Protocol Amending the 
Tax Convention with Japan, supra note 183.  The treaties entered into force on 
Nov. 27, 2019 and Aug. 30, 2019, respectively.  See Press Release, US. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, Treasury Announces Action on Tax Protocols with Two Key Trad-
ing Partners (Aug. 30, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-re-
leases/sm763. 
 186 Tax Convention with Chile, Chile-U.S., Jan. 24, 2013, S. TREATY DOC. 
No. 112-8 (2017) [hereinafter Chile-U.S. Convention].  This treaty has not yet 
been approved by the Senate, as discussed in Section IV.B.3. 
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C. The Curated U.S. Tax Treaty Network 
1. IN GENERAL 
As noted above, the United States has fifty-eight comprehensive 
bilateral tax treaties in force.187 Thirty-four of those treaties are with 
OECD members and fewer than thirty are with non-OECD mem-
bers.188 This is quite small for a developed country. By contrast, 
both the United Kingdom189 and France190 have well over one hun-
dred treaties in force, while Germany191 and Spain192 each have over 
ninety. Moreover, seventeen of Spain’s treaties are with LATAM 
                                                                                                             
 187 United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, supra note 1 (listing all coun-
tries with which the United States has tax treaties). In addition to the fifty-eight 
comprehensive treaties, the United States has a limited tax treaty with Bermuda 
that covers only insurance activities. Convention Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (on Behalf of the Government of Bermuda) Relating 
to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters, 
U.K.-U.S., July 11, 1986, T.I.A.S. No. 11,676. Its application has been further 
limited by a Congressional override that reinstated the application of the federal 
excise tax on insurance policies issued by Bermudan insurance companies with 
respect to U.S.-situs risks, which had been waived by the treaty. Technical and 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6139, 102 Stat. 3342, 
3724 (1988). 
 188 Compare List of OECD Member Countries – Ratifications of the Conven-
tion on the OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
https://www.oecd.org/about/document/list-oecd-member-countries.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 27, 2019), with United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, supra note 
1 (listing all countries with which the United States has tax treaties). 
 189 See United Kingdom - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for 
Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). 
 190 See France - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Doc-
umentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). 
 191 See Germany - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). 
 192 See Spain - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Docu-
mentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). 
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countries193 (even more than the United Kingdom)194 despite 
Spain’s significantly smaller treaty network. France has eleven trea-
ties195 and Germany has nine196 with LATAM countries. Interest-
ingly, China also has just over one hundred tax treaties, including 
nine with LATAM countries.197 
It would be very easy for the United States to have a much larger 
tax treaty network. The United States receives many requests from 
other countries to negotiate tax treaties every year.198 Most requests 
go through an initial three-step evaluation: 
(a) Is there double taxation or other issues that can 
only be resolved through a treaty?199 
                                                                                                             
 193 See id. Spain is a party to tax treaties with Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Id. 
 194 The United Kingdom has tax treaties or tax treaty-like relationships with 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Grenada, Guy-
ana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela. See United Kingdom - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, su-
pra note 189. The United Kingdom also has an income tax arrangement with the 
Cayman Islands, which applies primarily to business profits and the income of 
individuals, but does not affect treaty withholding rates.  See Income Tax Treaty, 
U.K.-Cayman Is., June 15, 2019, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (ac-
cessed Jan. 26, 2020). 
 195 See France - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, supra note 190. France has 
tax treaties with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Panama, St. Maarten, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Id. 
 196 See Germany - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, supra note 191. Germany 
is a party to tax treaties with Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. 
 197 See China Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Docu-
mentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). China has tax treaties with Barbados, Brazil, 
Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Id. 
 198 Bilateral Tax Treaties and Protocol: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 105th Cong. 8 (1993) (statement of Joseph H. Guttentag, Assistant 
Secretary for International Tax Affairs, Department of the Treasury) (“The De-
partment of the Treasury receives regular and numerous requests to enter tax 
treaty negotiations. As a result it has been necessary for us to establish priori-
ties.”). 
 199 See id.  (“Another priority is to conclude treaties or protocols that are likely 
to provide the greatest benefits to United States taxpayers, such as when economic 
relations are hindered by tax obstacles.”). 
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(b) Is there sufficient trade and investment to justify 
a treaty?200 
(c) Are there any deal-breakers?201 
These are considered in more detail in the remainder of this Sec-
tion. 
a. Issues that Need to be Resolved by Treaty 
The preceding Sections described some of the reasons why a tax 
treaty may be necessary even if each of the treaty partners includes 
provisions in their domestic laws that relieve double taxation.202 
Differences in characterization and source can be resolved through 
general or customized provisions,203 although it is true that the 
OECD Model does little to address those issues.204 The primary in-
centive for a new tax treaty almost always will be the prospect of 
reducing “excessive” withholding taxes—those gross basis with-
holding taxes that result in the recipient being taxed more heavily 
than if it had paid tax on a net basis in either Contracting State.205 
The countries that do not satisfy this threshold typically are those 
that do not have a generally applicable income tax. The United 
States will not usually enter into a tax treaty if there is no possibility 
                                                                                                             
 200 See id. (“We also try to conclude treaties with countries that have the po-
tential to be significant trading partners.”). 
 201 See Bilateral Tax Treaties and Protocol: Hearing on Treaty Docs. 105-55, 
105-57, 106-3, 106-12, 105-56, 106-9, 106-11, 106-13 Before the S. Comm. On 
Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 16 (1999) (statement of Philip R. West, Int’l Tax 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury) (“Information exchange is one of the handful 
of issues that we discuss with the other country before beginning formal negotia-
tions because it is one of a very few issues that we consider non-negotiable . . . . 
A second aspect of U.S. tax treaty policy to deal with avoidance and evasion is to 
include in all treaties comprehensive provisions designed to prevent ‘treaty shop-
ping.’). 
 202 See supra Part II. 
 203 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING 
THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996, at 1–2 
(1996) (explaining that the Model is only a starting point and negotiations with 
countries will lead to different, custom provisions). 
 204 See generally OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7. 
 205 See Pending Bilateral Tax Treaties and OECD Tax Convention: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 47 (1990) (statement of 
Frank Kittredge, President, National Foreign Trade Council). 
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of double taxation as between the two countries.206 One effect of this 
policy was the 1984 notice of termination of the extension of the 
1945 U.K.-U.S. tax treaty to the United Kingdom’s overseas territo-
ries, many of them in the Caribbean, and the United States’ refusal 
to enter into replacement treaties with many of those countries.207 
This policy also means that the United States does not have tax 
treaties with countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”)—
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (“U.A.E.”)208—despite significant amounts of U.S. invest-
ment in those countries.209 While some GCC countries now impose 
corporate taxes, in several cases those taxes are imposed only on 
foreign enterprises (Kuwait),210 the oil and gas industry (Bah-
rain),211 oil and gas and foreign banks (U.A.E.),212 resident compa-
nies and permanent establishments of foreign enterprises (Saudi 
                                                                                                             
 206 Protocol Amending the Tax Convention with Spain: Hearing on Treaty 
Doc. 113-4 Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Relations 113th Cong. (2014) (state-
ment of Robert Stack, Deputy Assistant Secretary (International Tax Affairs), 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury) (“With certain countries there simply may not be the 
type of cross-border tax issues that are best resolved by a treaty. For example, if 
a country does not impose significant income taxes, or imposes tax on a strictly 
territorial basis (that is, it exempts not only dividend income but all foreign source 
income from taxation by reason of its foreign source), there is little possibility of 
unresolved double taxation of cross-border income, given the fact that the United 
States provides foreign tax credits to its citizens and residents regardless of the 
existence of an income tax treaty. Under such a circumstance, it would not be 
appropriate to enter into a comprehensive tax treaty with that particular country 
because doing so would result in a unilateral concession of taxing rights by the 
United States.”). 
 207 See Omri Marian, Unilateral Responses to Tax Treaty Abuse:  A Func-
tional Approach, 41 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1157, 1171 (2016), available athttp://schol-
arship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/765. 
 208 Cf. See United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, supra note 1 (listing 
all of the countries with which United States has a tax treaty). 
 209 See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113 (listing the United States as 
investing $423 million in Bahrain, $296 million in Kuwait, $1.8 billion in Oman, 
$8.2 billion in Qatar, $11.1 billion in Saudi Arabia, and $16.8 billion in U.A.E.). 
 210 Kuwait - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). 
 211 Bahrain - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for Fis-
cal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). 
 212 Although there is a theoretical corporate tax on entities in all sectors, in 
practice taxation is limited to the oil and gas and financial sector.  See United Arab 
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Arabia),213 or income arising in that country (Qatar).214 Thus, a tax 
treaty is unlikely to provide much relief from host State taxation in 
those countries. The primary effect of such treaties would be to re-
duce U.S. withholding taxes on investment income earned by resi-
dents of the other States. While some countries will enter into tax 
treaties to provide incentives for inward investment,215 the United 
States does not.  
b. Is There Sufficient Trade and Investment to Justify a 
Tax Treaty? 
A much more difficult hurdle for most developing countries to 
overcome is the issue of whether there is sufficient trade and invest-
ment to justify a treaty.216 This consideration by itself disqualifies 
many African countries, for example, where the amount of U.S. out-
ward investment is in the low millions.217 
It is hard to define how much trade and investment is “enough” 
to justify a tax treaty. The United States signed a tax treaty with Vi-
etnam in 2015,218 where the current stock of U.S. outward foreign 
                                                                                                             
Emirates - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Doc-
umentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). 
 213 Saudi Arabia - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for 
Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). 
 214 Qatar - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). 
 215 France, for example, has entered into tax treaties that eliminate most 
source-basis withholding taxes with all of the GCC countries. See France – Treaty 
Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 
15, 2020).  Because those countries do not impose withholding taxes or, generally, 
tax their own residents on foreign source income, the treaties are not primarily to 
prevent double taxation. It can be assumed, therefore, that the purpose is to en-
courage investment in France by GCC investors.  See Eric M. Zolt, Tax Treaties 
and Developing Countries 72 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming) for a general discussion 
of tax treaties as investment incentives. 
 216 See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 27 cmt. ¶ 1 (dis-
cussing what negotiating states need to consider before entering a treaty, including 
the trade and investment flows). 
 217 See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113 (listing outward investment 
of the United States). 
 218 Viet.-U.S. Treaty, supra note 169; see also United States and Vietnam Sign 
First Income Tax Treaty, ERNST & YOUNG LLP (July 15, 2015), 
https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert--united-states-and-
vietnam-sign-first-income-tax-treaty. 
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direct investment was about two billion dollars at the end of 2017.219 
Countries with the lowest amount of U.S. outward foreign direct in-
vestment with which the United States nevertheless has tax treaties 
are Latvia ($71 million),220 Estonia ($72 million),221 and Lithuania 
($154 million).222 Those treaties represent a special circumstance, 
however, as those countries took the position that they were not cov-
ered by the tax treaty between the Soviet Union and the United 
States because they were occupied countries.223 Accordingly, there 
was some pressure to negotiate new agreements to cover invest-
ments in those countries that were made before the break-up of the 
Soviet Union.224 Moreover, the three countries negotiated treaties 
together, as their treaty policies were quite similar.225 Currently, the 
real foreign direct investment position with respect to those coun-
tries is now close to three hundred million dollars.226 
After the Baltic States, the lowest in terms of stocks of invest-
ment from the United States are Jamaica ($167 million), Sri Lanka 
                                                                                                             
 219 See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113 (listing the outward invest-
ment of the U.S. in Vietnam as two billion dollars). 
 220 See Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Latvia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Lat.-U.S., Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. No. 
105-57 (1998); Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113. 
 221 See Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Estonia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Est.-U.S., Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. 
No. 105-56 (1998); Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113. 
 222 See Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Lithuania for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Lith.-U.S., Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. 
No. 105-55 (1998); Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113. 
 223 Lawrence Juda, United States’ Nonrecognition of the Soviet Union’s An-
nexation of the Baltic States: Politics and Law, 6 J. BALTIC STUDIES 272, 274 
(1975); Peep Kalamäe, Baltic States – United States Treaty Status, TAX NEWS 
SERVICE 344, 344 (1995). 
 224 See 1999 Bilateral Tax Treaties and Protocol, supra note 165, at 21 (state-
ment of Philip R. West, International Tax Counsel, Department of the Treasury) 
(explaining the competitive disadvantage for U.S. buinesses in the Baltics due to 
their competitors having tax treaties with them already, decreasing taxation on 
their operations). 
 225 See id. at 35 (prepared statement of Lindy Paull, Chief of Staff of Joint 
Comm. on Taxation). 
 226 See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113 (totaling outward investment 
between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at $297 million). 
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($168 million), Tunisia ($279 million), Slovenia ($369 million), 
Ukraine ($398 million), and Morocco ($412 million).227 The other 
U.S. tax treaty counterparts below $1 billion of U.S. outward invest-
ment are Bangladesh ($460 million), Pakistan ($518 million), Malta 
($601 million)—however, Maltese FDI in the United States is al-
most $1.6 billion228—and Bulgaria ($848 million).229 
As a result, it can be assumed that the minimum amount of U.S. 
foreign direct investment to be “sufficient” is no more than some-
where between $150 million and $300 million. If so, there are a 
number of LATAM countries that currently do not have tax treaties 
with the United States that would satisfy the threshold. These in-
clude Argentina ($14.9 billion), Aruba ($190 million), Bahamas 
($23.3 billion), Bolivia ($598 million), Brazil ($68 billion), Cayman 
Islands ($331 billion), Chile ($26 billion),230 Colombia ($7.2 bil-
lion), Costa Rica ($2 billion), Dominican Republic ($2 billion), Ec-
uador ($981 million), El Salvador ($3 billion), Guatemala ($1 bil-
lion), Honduras ($1.4 billion), Nicaragua ($187 million), Panama 
($4.7 billion), Paraguay ($179 million), Peru ($6.3 billion), St. Kitts 
and Nevis ($612 million), St. Lucia ($357 million), and Uruguay 
($1.6 billion).231 
Over the decades, the Treasury Department’s tax treaty efforts 
in LATAM have focused on Brazil232 and Argentina.233 Tax treaty 
negotiations with Colombia have taken place,234 but it is unclear 
where they stand. The Treasury Department perhaps should broaden 
                                                                                                             
 227 Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113. 
 228 Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113. 
 229 Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113. 
 230 See Chile-U.S. Convention, supra note 186; see also infra Part IV.B.3. 
 231 Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113. 
 232 See BRAZ.-U.S. BUS. COUNCIL, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A 
ROADMAP TO A U.S.-BRAZIL TAX TREATY 1 (2019), https://www.brazilcoun-
cil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Roadmap-U.S.-Brazil-Tax-Treaty_1.pdf 
(“For decades the U.S. and Brazil, the two largest economies and democracies in 
the Western Hemisphere, have attempted to lay the groundwork for a bilateral tax 
treaty (BTT)”). 
 233 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Lew at Meeting with Argentine Finance Minister Prat-Gay (Sep. 26, 
2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl5060.aspx. 
 234 See Sarah Carpenter, Colombia, U.S. Negotiating Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES 
INT’L, Oct. 10, 2016, at 153, 153. 
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its view. The six parties to the Dominican Republic-Central Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic)235 together host 
almost ten billion dollars of U.S. foreign direct investment,236 sug-
gesting that a joint negotiation similar to that with the Baltics could 
be a useful way forward. Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and even Paraguay 
could also be considered. 
c. Are There Any Deal-Breakers? 
Once the Treasury Department determines that a new treaty re-
lationship will provide sufficient benefits, it then determines 
whether there are any deal-breakers that would prevent the success-
ful conclusion of an agreement.237 The primary issues that have pre-
vented negotiations with developing countries in the past have been 
(1) the U.S.’s insistence on including a “limitation on benefits” pro-
vision to prevent treaty-shopping, (2) an information exchange pro-
vision that overrides both bank secrecy and “domestic tax interest” 
requirements, and (3) the inability of the United States to agree to a 
“tax-sparing” provision.238 While the OECD has made significant 
                                                                                                             
 235 See CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America FTA), OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta (last visited Dec. 27, 
2019). 
 236 See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113. 
 237 See generally U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, at 1 (discuss-
ing the polices behind the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty). 
 238 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING 
AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 73, 78–80 (2007), https://www.treasury.gov/re-
source-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Earnings-Stripping-Transfer-Pric-
ing-2007.pdf (explaining the need to prevent treaty-shopping through the inclu-
sion of limitations on benefits provisions); Reuven Avi-Yonah, If Not Now, 
When? U.S. Tax Treaties with Latin America After TCJA, 2019 INT’L TAX J. 51, 
51 (2019) (discussing how the United States refuses to grant tax sparing provi-
sions, leading countries to decline to enter treaties with the United States). 
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progress on the issues of treaty-shopping239 and exchange of infor-
mation240 for tax purposes, some countries, such as Brazil, may still 
take the position that any reduction in source-State taxation must be 
accompanied by a tax-sparing provision.241 Unless these issues can 
be resolved, the United States generally will not move forward. 
IV. HOW DIFFICULT CAN IT BE? 
Although the United States has a relatively small tax treaty net-
work,242 the network includes a number of countries that are signif-
icantly less important to the U.S. economy than many of the coun-
tries of Latin America.243 This Part will first discuss, as a general 
matter, whether the U.S. policies create irreconcilable differences. 
It will then focus on three case studies that may provide some les-
sons for the future in order to determine whether that limited treaty 
network is inevitable. 
                                                                                                             
 239 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PREVENTING THE 
GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6 
2015 FINAL REPORT 17–20 (2015), https://www.oecd-ili-
brary.org/docserver/9789264241695-en.pdf?expires=1577475586&id=id&ac-
cname=guest&checksum=66BE62630086EC0207E2D132B8EF1F22. 
 240 See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 26, ¶¶ 4–5. 
 241 See BRAZ.-U.S. BUS. COUNCIL, supra note 232, at 3 (noting that Brazil has 
signed tax treaties with Singapore and Switzerland that do not include tax sparing 
credits). However, those tax treaties with Singapore and Switzerland are not yet 
in force.  See Brazil - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 8, 2020). 
 242 See United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, supra note 1 (listing all of 
the countries with which United States has a tax treaty).   
 243 See, e.g., Top U.S. Trade Partners: Ranked by 2017 Total Import Value for 
Goods (in Millions of U.S. Dollars), U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (2017), 
https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/web-
content/tg_ian_003364.pdf (showing Chile, Colombia, Argentina, and Peru as be-
ing among the top trade partners of the U.S.). 
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A. Is U.S. Tax Treaty Policy the Problem? (Reluctance 
Revisited) 
The most important recurring theme in this Article has been the 
goal of the United States, particularly in treaties with other devel-
oped countries, to reduce withholding rates to the extent possible.244 
This desire is usually inconsistent with the goals of developing 
countries.245 It has been said that “[t]he developing country partners 
often [have] conflicting objectives [which] are attracting U.S. capi-
tal and technology, while, at the same time, preserving scarce reve-
nues.”246 To put it more bluntly: “Developing countries badly need 
both to attract foreign capital and to raise revenue by taxing that 
capital; but the more they tax, the less they attract.”247 
Eduardo Baistrocchi posits that developing countries resolve 
this dilemma by signing tax treaties that look like the OECD and 
U.N. Models because of strong network effects that allow for “com-
petition within a compatible standard.”248 That is, once a basic tech-
nology is in place, competitors can differentiate themselves through 
features that appeal to different customers.249 
The use of the OECD Model as a template for an actual treaty 
provides for a common understanding of terms that are identical to 
those in the OECD Model.250 What seems less understood is that the 
use of language that differs from the OECD Model clearly indicates 
                                                                                                             
 244 See 2014 Treaties Hearing, supra note 70 (statement of Nancy L. 
McLernon, President & CEO Organization for International Investment). 
 245 See Kingson, supra note 139, at 1159–60 (discussing the goals of countries 
like Brazil and how those goals tend to conflict with those of the United States). 
 246 Tax Conventions With: The Russian Federation, Treaty Doc. 102-39; 
United Mexican States, Treaty Doc. 103-7; The Czech Republic, Treaty Doc. 103-
17; The Slovak Republic, Treaty Doc. 103-18; and the Netherlands, Treaty Doc. 
103-6. Protocols Amending Tax Conventions With: Israel, Treaty Doc. 103-16; 
The Netherlands, Treaty Doc. 103-19; and Barbados, Treaty Doc. 102-41: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103th Cong. 19 (1993) (statement 
of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of the Treas-
ury). 
 247 Kingson, supra note 139, at 1159. 
 248 Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the 
Emerging World: Theory and Implications, 2008 BRIT. TAX REV. 356, 358–60 
(2008). 
 249 See id. (explaining that a compatible standard allows competitors to focus 
their efforts on “non-agreed dimensions”). 
 250 See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, at I-1, ¶¶ 2–3. 
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that the parties reject the result that would be provided by the OECD 
Model and, in some cases, also the U.N. Model. The use of the 
OECD Model template facilitates the negotiation of treaties that de-
viate because the use of standard language for the majority of the 
treaty, to which both parties agree, 251 allows the negotiators to 
spend more time on the issues where their positions diverge.252 
Arguments that treaties based on the OECD Model are bad for 
developing countries253 therefore miss the point that most develop-
ing countries are not entering into treaties that are identical to the 
OECD Model.254 Wim Wijnen and Jan de Goede have directed a 
research project that catalogs the prevalence of various provisions 
found in the U.N. Model that occur in 1,811 treaties entered into 
between 1997 and 2013.255 Although some provisions occur more 
often than others, their research suggests that developing countries 
have a fair amount of bargaining strength to achieve results that are 
important to them. For example, of the 1,811 treaties studied, 1,579 
                                                                                                             
 251 See id. at I-4 (discussing the purpose of the OECD Model Convention). 
 252 Of course, standard language has also developed with respect to some com-
mon deviations from the OECD Model, again because of the network benefits of 
using standardized language. 
 253 See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 71, at 939 (“In this Article, I show that these 
ubiquitous treaties are not necessary for preventing double taxation. Rather, they 
serve much less heroic goals, such as easing bureaucratic hassles and coordinating 
tax terms between the contracting countries, and much more cynical goals, par-
ticularly redistributing tax revenues from the poorer to the richer signatory coun-
tries.”). However, in contrast to Kingson’s article, supra note 139, at 1210–62, 
which discusses specific provisions of specific tax treaties with which he disa-
greed, Dagan’s article, supra, cites to no actual tax treaties. In their discussion of 
the model tax treaties and developing nations, Kim Brooks and Richard Krever 
also cite only to secondary sources, although those sources occasionally cite to 
actual treaties. See generally Kim Brooks & Richard Krever, The Troubling Role 
of Tax Treaties, in 51 TAX DESIGN ISSUES WORLDWIDE 159–78, (Geerten M. M. 
Michielse & Victor Thuronyi eds., 2015).  
 254 Compare OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7l, with Conven-
tion for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Braz.-India, arts. 12–15, Apr. 26, 1988, 
https://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/pages/international-taxation/dtaa.aspx 
(1992) (differing from the OECD Model in the taxation of royalties and other 
forms of income).  
 255 See Wim Wijnen & Jan de Goede, The UN Model in Practice 1997-2013, 
68 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 118, 118 (2014); see also Willem F.G. Wijnen & Marco 
Magenta, The UN Model in Practice, 51 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 
574, 574 (1997). 
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(approximately 87%) allowed the source State to tax royalties.256 Of 
the treaties between an OECD member and non-OECD member, 
85% allowed for taxation of royalties by the source State.257 As be-
tween two non-OECD members, 94% of treaties provide for taxa-
tion of royalties by the source State, while only 72% of treaties be-
tween two OECD members did so.258 Moreover, 42% of the treaties 
included a rule expanding the definition of a permanent establish-
ment to include the furnishing of services in a source State for a 
specified period (most often six months, but sometimes as low as 
one month).259 Again, the adoption rate for this provision was high-
est (58%) among treaties between two non-OECD members, but still 
significant (35%) in treaties between an OECD member and a non-
OECD member, and between two OECD members (17%).260 Alt-
hough the percentage of treaties adopting other provisions is fre-
quently lower than for these examples, such alternative provisions 
still occur in hundreds of treaties.261 
The fact that these provisions occur at relatively high rates both 
in treaties between two OECD member countries and two non-
OECD member countries suggests that another common assumption 
is flawed. Commentators frequently argue that treaties between 
OECD members are “reciprocal” or “symmetric,”262 which explains 
why countries are willing to reduce source State taxation. On the 
other hand, treaties between OECD members and non-OECD mem-
bers are “asymmetric.”263 If things were that simple, one would not 
                                                                                                             
 256 Wijnen & de Goede, supra note 255, at 129–30. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 122. 
 260 Id. 
 261 For example, 1,234 treaties out of the sample include a modification to the 
definition of “royalties” that allows the source State to tax rental payments relat-
ing to the leasing of equipment.  Id. at 130.  
 262 See Baistrocchi, supra note 248, at 357 n.8 (“The symmetric tax treaty net-
work refers to tax treaties in which there are approximately equal investment 
flows between contracting states. Tax treaties concluded between developed 
countries (such as the US-UK tax treaty) or between developing countries (such 
as the Argentina-Brazil tax treaty) are examples of symmetric tax treaties.”). 
 263 See id. at 353 (“The asymmetric tax treaty network consists of bilateral tax 
treaties concluded between developed and developing countries. The word ‘asym-
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expect 72% of treaties between two OECD members264 to provide a 
positive withholding rate on royalties. 
Wijnen and de Goede note that they make a simplifying assump-
tion by distinguishing between OECD and non-OECD countries as 
proxies for developed and developing countries.265 There are “re-
source rich” countries that, while not members of the OECD, are 
also not developing countries as defined by the World Bank.266 
Moreover, some “emerging market” countries are significant capital 
exporters as well as capital importers.267 
Even those observations do not reflect the complexity of bilat-
eral economic relationships. Baistrocchi described the United States 
as having thirty-four asymmetric treaties (those with non-OECD 
countries) and twenty-nine symmetric treaties (those with other 
OECD member States).268 However, comparing stocks of inward 
and outward foreign direct investment shows that even fewer U.S. 
treaties are symmetric.269 For example, France’s FDI in the United 
States was close to three times the amount of U.S. FDI in France as 
of the end of 2017.270 The Japan-to-United States ratio was about 
                                                                                                             
metric’ denotes unequal investment flows between contracting states: while de-
veloping countries normally are capital importers, developed countries habitually 
are capital exporters.”). 
 264 See Wijnen & de Goede, supra note 255, at 129–30. 
 265 See id. at 119. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. 
 268 See Baistrocchi, supra note 248, at 356. Baistrocchi was writing in 2008, 
before Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia became members of the 
OECD. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD ANNUAL REPORT 
2008, at 115 (2008), https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/40556222.pdf (listing the 
thirty member countries of the OECD in 2008); Where: Global Reach, ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-part-
ners/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) (listing all current OECD member countries and 
the year joined, including Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia). Pre-
sumably, U.S. tax treaties with those countries, which fell into the “asymmetric” 
category at the time of his writing, became “symmetric” when they joined the 
OECD, demonstrating the essential meaninglessness of this categorization. 
 269 Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United 
States, supra note 113. 
 270 Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United 
States, supra note 113. 
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the same.271 Both Germany and Spain had about twice the amount 
of FDI in the United States as the amount of U.S. FDI into those 
countries.272 Eight other OECD member States—Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Sweden273—were 
roughly symmetrical, frequently with the other OECD country’s 
FDI in the United States exceeding U.S. FDI into that State.274 The 
bilateral FDI relationships with the other twenty-three OECD mem-
bers were asymmetric in favor of the United States, some to a strik-
ing degree.275 
Examining FDI stocks for some other OECD members provides 
further evidence that the OECD/non-OECD assumption oversimpli-
fies. For example, Argentina’s stock of FDI in Mexico was $2.5 bil-
lion as of the end of 2017,276 while Mexico’s reciprocal position in 
Argentina was $661 million,277 the opposite of what would be pre-
dicted. On the other hand, Brazil’s FDI position in Mexico was $906 
million,278 while Mexico’s position in Brazil was $9.5 billion,279 in 
line with the assumption. Similarly, Mexico’s FDI position in Co-
lombia was $4.9 billion,280 almost five times that of Colombian FDI 
in Mexico.281 Mexico’s FDI position in Chile was $2.7 billion,282 
                                                                                                             
 271 Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United 
States, supra note 113. 
 272 Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United 
States, supra note 113. 
 273 See Where: Global Reach, supra note _ (listing the current OECD mem-
bers and the year each country ratified the OECD Convention). 
 274 Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United 
States, supra note 113. 
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 276 Table 1-i: Inward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: Reporting 
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 277 Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: Report-
ing Economy: Mexico, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regu-
lar.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-o: Mex-
ico]. 
 278 Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276. 
 279 Table 1-o: Mexico, supra note 277. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276. 
 282 Table 1-o: Mexico, supra note 277. 
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almost twice that of fellow OECD-member Chile’s FDI position in 
Mexico.283 
Almost all of Chile’s treaties284 are asymmetric, but in opposite 
directions.285 In general, its treaties with other OECD member coun-
tries are asymmetric with Chile being the capital importer.286 Its 
treaties with non-OECD members generally are asymmetric with 
Chile being the capital exporter.287 Chile’s position as both capital 
importer and capital exporter was foreseen by those who developed 
Chile’s tax treaty policy in the 1990s.288 
It is likely that one of the “emerging market” economies to 
which Wijnen and de Goede refer289 is China, which has introduced 
its “Belt and Road” initiative to develop infrastructure in both de-
veloping and developed countries.290 Interestingly, the International 
Monetary Fund’s country reports on China show only FDI into 
China.291 To discover where China is investing, it is necessary to 
                                                                                                             
 283 Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276. 
 284 See Chile - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Docu-
mentation, (accessed Jan. 8, 2020). 
 285 Compare Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: 
Reporting Economy: Chile, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regu-
lar.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-i: Chile], 
with Table 1-i: Inward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: Reporting 
Economy: Chile, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regu-
lar.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-o: 
Chile]. 
 286 For example, Australia invests $772 million into Chile, but Chile only in-
vests $37 million into Australia. Compare Table 1-i: Chile, supra note 285, with 
Table 1-o: Chile, supra note 285. 
 287 For example, Chile invests $13.3 billion into Brazil, whereas Brazil only 
invests $5.1 billion in Chile. Compare Table 1-o: Chile, supra note 285, with Ta-
ble 1-i: Chile, supra note 285. 
 288 See Patricia Brown et al., Insiders’ View of Treaty Negotiations, in REPORT 
OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-FIRST TAX CONFERENCE, at 25:5–25:6 (2009). 
 289 See Wijnen & de Goede, supra note 255, at 119 (“[T]here is an increasing 
group of developing countries with emerging economics that have become signif-
icant capital exporters.”). 
 290 See Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road 
Initiative, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. 
 291 See Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: Re-
porting Economy: China, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regu-
lar.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-o: 
China]. 
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look at other countries’ inward investment charts.292 For example, 
Mexico’s charts show about $731 million of FDI from China into 
Mexico,293 with no Mexican FDI into China.294 Likewise, Chile 
shows no FDI from China,295 and just over $100 million of Chilean 
investment into China.296 
Martin Hearson is doing important empirical work that looks at 
investment asymmetries to determine how they affect particular pro-
visions of treaties.297 He determines “that neither investment asym-
metry nor power dynamics alone are sufficient to explain the out-
come of treaty negotiations.”298 In fact, Hearson’s review of actual 
treaties reveals the following: 
much of the conventional wisdom about tax treaty 
negotiations is partial at best. The clear trend towards 
declining source taxing rights in WHT provisions is 
counterbalanced by greater source taxing rights in 
other areas. There is important variation across re-
gion, development status and type of treaty partner. 
Longstanding OECD members are not necessarily 
the toughest negotiators with developing countries, 
in comparison to emerging economies.299 
A review of the actual terms of U.S. tax treaties is likely to bear 
this out. Although the reduction of withholding rates is an important 
goal of U.S. tax treaty policy, it is also true that the United States 
does not achieve those goals in every tax treaty.300 Rather, the “hall-
mark” of U.S. tax treaty policy is “achieving the best deal it [can] 
with each treaty partner.”301 In fact, the majority of U.S. tax treaties 
                                                                                                             
 292 See, e.g., Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276; Table 1-i: Chile, supra note 
285. 
 293 See Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276. 
 294 See Table 1-o: Mexico, supra note 277. 
 295 See Table 1-i: Chile, supra note 285. 
 296 See Table 1-o: Chile, supra note 285. 
 297 See Hearson, supra note 18, at 20–25. 
 298 Id. at 24. 
 299 Id. at 25. 
 300 See Brown et al., supra note 288, at 25:8. 
 301 Id. at 25:7. 
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continue to provide for a positive withholding rate on royalties.302 
This is due in large part to the number of provisions that, from the 
U.S. perspective, are non-negotiable.303 If many provisions are non-
negotiable, concessions will have to be made with respect to other 
provisions. While the Joint Committee on Taxation has mused about 
whether “developing country concessions” were appropriate with 
respect to particular tax treaties,304 upward deviations from U.S. pre-
ferred withholding rates were not raised as issues during the Sen-
ate’s review of the U.S. treaties with Japan,305 Bulgaria,306 or 
Chile.307  
                                                                                                             
 302 See generally TABLE 1. TAX RATES ON INCOME OTHER THAN PERSONAL 
SERVICES UNDER CHAPTER 3, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AND INCOME TAX 
TREATIES, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/Tax_Treaty_Table_1_2019_Feb.pdf. Close to forty U.S. treaties provide for 
some level of source State taxation with respect to at least some categories of 
royalties. Id. 
 303 See supra Part II. 
 304 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-4-06, EXPLANATION 
OF THE PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH 61 (2006), http://www.jct.gov/x-4-06.pdf 
(“An issue is whether these developing-country concessions represent appropriate 
U.S. treaty policy, and if so, whether Bangladesh is an appropriate recipient of 
these concessions.”). 
 305 See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108th CONG., 
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATE 
AND JAPAN (Comm. Print 2004) (discussing a large number of potential issues, 
none of which was the 10% general withholding rate on interest). 
 306 See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110th CONG.,  
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND BULGARIA (Comm. Print 2008) (listing only two issues, the treatment of stu-
dents, trainees, teachers and researchers and whether the rule allowing the provi-
sion of services to constitute a permanent establishment was acceptable).  
 307 See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113th CONG., 
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND CHILE (Comm. Print 2014) (listing two potential issues, treaty-shopping and 
exchange of information and collection assistance, but accepting positive with-
holding rates on interest and royalties). 
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B. Three Case Studies 
1. BRAZIL. 
Brazil and the United States signed a tax treaty in 1967.308 It was 
abandoned309 after the Senate entered two reservations.310 The sub-
ject of one—a deduction for charitable contributions made to enti-
ties in the other State311—might now be less controversial as it has 
been included in treaties with Canada,312 Israel,313 and Mexico.314 
The other, relating to the extent to which tax treaties should provide 
incentives for U.S. investment in Brazil,315 is still relevant today, as 
discussed below. 
To understand the problem with the Brazilian treaty, it is neces-
sary to consider a little history. In 1957, the United States signed a 
treaty with Pakistan that included a “tax-sparing credit.”316 There 
are several forms of such a credit; in this case, the United States 
would have been obligated to give a foreign tax credit against U.S. 
tax otherwise due for taxes that Pakistan had forgiven pursuant to an 
                                                                                                             
 308 Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the United States of Brazil for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 13, 1967, Braz.-U.S. in 8 WALTER H. 
DIAMOND & DOROTHY B. DIAMOND, INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES OF ALL 
NATIONS 56, 56 (1976) [hereinafter Braz.-U.S. Convention]. 
 309 Cf. TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2019, at 49 (2019), 
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-TIF-Bilaterals-
6.13.2019-web-version.pdf (listing current tax treaties the United States has with 
Brazil). 
 310 S. EXEC. RPT. No. 5, at 1–3 (1968). 
 311 Id. at 3. 
 312 See Can.-U.S. Convention, supra note 25, art. XXI. 
 313 See Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel with Respect 
to Taxes on Income, Isr.-U.S., art. 15-A, May 30, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 96-
48 (1980). 
 314 See Mex.-U.S. Convention, supra note 2, art. 22. 
 315 S. EXEC. RPT. No. 5, at 2. 
 316 See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income art. XV, Pak.-U.S., 
July 1, 1957, 10 U.S.T. 984 (1957) [hereinafter Pak.-U.S. Convention]. 
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investment incentive program.317 Pakistan argued that, absent the 
tax-sparing credit, the benefits of the incentive program would ac-
crue to the U.S. government, not to the U.S. investors.318 While U.S. 
business interests were, not surprisingly, in favor of the tax-sparing 
credit, opposition was based on the fact that the foreign tax credit 
was intended to place investment in the United States by U.S. tax-
payers on an equal footing with investment outside the United States 
by U.S. taxpayers.319 The tax-sparing credit would violate that prin-
ciple by favoring foreign investment.320 As it turned out, Pakistan 
abolished the incentive program so the Senate did not have to take a 
firm position, but its discomfort with the provision was clear and it 
entered a reservation to a provision that would have provided the 
tax-sparing benefits retroactively to two companies.321 
The 1967 Brazil-U.S. treaty did not include a tax-sparing 
credit.322 Instead, the treaty included an investment credit that gave 
eligible investors a credit equal to 7% of investments made in Brazil 
by U.S. residents.323 In exchange, Brazil agreed to reductions in its 
otherwise-applicable withholding taxes on investment income.324 
                                                                                                             
 317 See Pak.-U.S. Convention, supra note 316, art. XV(1) (“For the purposes 
of this credit there shall be deemed to have been paid by a United States domestic 
corporation the amount by which such Pakistan taxes (other than the business 
profits tax) have been reduced . . . “). 
 318 Double Taxation Conventions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations on Income Tax Convention with Austria; Supplementary Income Tax 
Convention with Canada; Supplementary Income Tax Protocol with Japan; and 
Income Tax Convention with Pakistan, 85th Cong. 13–14 (1957) (“[O]ther coun-
tries had a valid complaint that . . . what they forewent in the way of taxes merely 
put something into the United States Treasury instead of encouraging economic 
development there.”). 
 319 See Letter from Stanley S. Surrey, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to 
Carl Marcy, Senator, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Jan. 22, 1958). 
 320 James R. Hines Jr., Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 39, 45–
46 (James R. Hines Jr. ed., 2001) (noting how the Pakistan treaty encouraged for-
eign investment by American investors at the expense of investment in the United 
States). 
 321 See Mahesh C. Bijawat, Tax Sparing: An Instrument to Retain and Attract 
Foreign Capital, 6 J. INDIAN L. INST. 236, 240. 
 322 See Braz.-U.S. Convention, supra note 308, art. 7. 
 323 Id. 
 324 See Technical Memorandum of Treasury Department Concerning United 
States-Brazil Income Tax Convention, in Tax Conventions with Brazil, Canada, 
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The Senate entered a reservation preventing the investment credit 
from taking effect, which in turn would have allowed Brazil to revert 
to its domestic withholding rates on dividends, interest, and royal-
ties.325 Accordingly, the treaty would have allowed little in the way 
of benefits, which led to its abandonment. 
Brazil continues to see a linkage between tax-sparing credits and 
reductions in withholding rates.326 Because the United States cannot 
agree to a tax-sparing credit, the possibility of meaningful reduc-
tions in withholding rates seems low. 
In principle, a treaty that does not reduce withholding rates can 
be justified by other benefits, such as establishing thresholds for tax-
ation by the host State.327 This might be true, for example, in the 
case of a country that has expansive domestic rules regarding the 
taxation of business profits. However, because Brazil imposes with-
holding tax on most payments made by Brazilian companies328 and 
                                                                                                             
and Trinidad and Tobago: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th 
Cong. 101, 106 (1967) ( (“If Brazil considers that any modification or amendment 
as a result of this paragraph materially and adversely affects the credit allowed by 
this article, Brazil may, by giving notice to the United States through diplomatic 
channels, treat such modification or amendment as a suspension of the credit un-
der Article 29(6)(b) and suspend the reduced rates for dividends, interest, and 
royalties (Articles 12, 13, and 14).”). 
 325 S. Exec. Rpt. No. 5, at 2 (“It would not be in the best interests of the United 
States to encourage investments abroad by this device.”). 
 326 See Deborah Toaze, Tax Sparing: Good Intentions, Unintended Results, 49 
CANADIAN TAX J. 879, 885 (2001) (noting Brazil’s continued insistence on the 
inclusion of a tax-sparing provision as one of the major reasons why the U.S. and 
Brazil do not have a tax treaty); but see BRAZ.-U.S. BUS. COUNCIL, supra note 
232, at 6 (noting that Brazil has recently signed two treaties that do not include 
tax-sparing credits). 
 327 See generally, e.g., Arrangement Between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Cay-
man Islands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion, June 15, 2009, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (including provi-
sions on the taxation of individuals and of business profits, but no reductions of 
withholding taxes). 
 328  Brazil - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides - 7.3.4 Withholding 
Taxes, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 16, 2020). 
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limits deductions with respect to payments of interest329 and royal-
ties,330 it generally does not seek to expand the definition of “per-
manent establishment,” which could lead to more net basis taxation 
rather than the gross-basis withholding taxes that Brazil prefers.331 
In addition, Brazil’s domestic transfer pricing rules do not conform 
to the OECD’s arm’s length principle,332 which is understood to 
have been the reason that Germany terminated its treaty with Brazil 
in 2005.333 Accordingly, it is hard to see what benefits to taxpayers 
would justify the effort to negotiate a treaty. 
2. VENEZUELA 
It might seem unlikely to the casual observer that the United 
States’ only tax treaty with a South American country is with Ven-
ezuela. The explanation is relatively simple—Citgo. The acquisition 
of Citgo, a major U.S. petroleum company, by the Venezuelan state 
oil company between 1986 and 1990, made the relationship between 
the United States and Venezuela less one-sided.334 Moreover, gov-
ernments generally prefer not to pay taxes to other governments. 
This created an incentive for Venezuela to reduce U.S. withholding 
taxes on profit remittances from Citgo. 
Still, negotiations had languished over other issues until 1998, 
when it appeared that Hugo Chávez would become president of 
                                                                                                             
 329 Brazil - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides - 1.4.5 Interest, Int’l 
Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 16, 2020). 
 330 Brazil - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides - 1.4.6 Royalties, Int’l 
Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 16, 2020). 
 331 Sergio André Rocha, Agency Permanent Establishment ‘Brazilian Style’: 
Taxation of Profits Earned Through Commission Merchants, Agents and Repre-
sentatives, 41 INTERTAX 444, 444 (2013) (“This matter is discussed much more 
in the international forum and has never aroused much interest on the part of the 
Brazilian revenue authorities.”). 
 332 See Napoleão Dagnese, Is Brazil ‘Developed’? Termination of the Brazil-
Germany Tax Treaty, 34 INTERTAX 195, 197 (2006). 
 333 See id. at 195. 
 334 See Katherine Blunt, Citgo Saga: How the Houston Refiner’s Future Be-
came So Uncertain, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, https://www.houstonchroni-
cle.com/business/energy/article/CITGO-13261273.php (last updated Sept. 30, 
2018) (“When Petróleos de Venezuela became the sole owner of Citgo Petroleum 
in 1990, the state-owned oil company known as PDVSA was among the largest 
and most profitable energy companies in the world.”). 
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Venezuela.335 Negotiations became more urgent, and the treaty was 
signed a week before Chávez became president.336 Although it was 
initially unclear whether the new regime would embrace the agree-
ment, the economic arguments in its favor became even stronger af-
ter Venezuela announced plans to shift from a territorial to a world-
wide tax system starting in 2001.337 
3. CHILE 
If the U.S.-Venezuela tax treaty is a story of successfully turning 
deadlines into opportunities, the lack of a treaty with Chile can be 
largely attributed to bad timing. Until the 1990s, Chile entered into 
agreements directly with investors rather than tax treaties with gov-
ernments.338 By the mid-1990s, Chile decided on a tax treaty policy 
that balanced the reality that it was likely to be a destination for in-
bound investment by more developed countries with its belief that it 
would also be an exporter of capital.339 Chile’s first treaties after 
establishing this policy were with Canada and Mexico in 1998, fol-
lowed by Ecuador in 1999.340 That is, negotiations with the United 
States were deferred in favor of negotiations with countries that do 
not push hard for reductions in withholding rates. Chile affirma-
tively wished to have as uniform a set of agreements as possible, and 
                                                                                                             
 335 See S. EXEC. REP. No. 106-6, at 14–15 (1999) (discussing how the chang-
ing political situation in Venezuela was a factor in the U.S.’s willingness to nego-
tiate a treaty). 
 336 U.S.-Venez. Convention, supra note 2. Chávez became president in Feb-
ruary 1999. See Brian A. Nelson, Hugo Chávez: President of Venezuela, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hugo-
Chavez (last visited Dec. 22, 2019). 
 337 See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-6, at 11 (“The Committee is encouraged that 
Venezuela is moving from its current territorial tax system to a worldwide tax 
system. The new worldwide tax system is expected to be more similar to that of 
the United States and, thus, would be more consistent with one of the principal 
purposes of the treaty—to avoid double taxation.”). 
 338 See Brown et al., supra note 288, at 25:5. 
 339 Id. 
 340 See OECD, THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE: STATUS OF LIST OF RESERVATIONS 
AND NOTIFICATIONS AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE 2-4, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-position-chile.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 
2019). 
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so it offered to include most-favored nation provisions in its trea-
ties.341 
Even though negotiations began towards the end of the Clinton 
Administration,342 they could not be concluded until Chile’s laws 
allowed for the exchange of bank information for tax purposes.343 
The treaty was signed on February 4, 2010.344 Because of this delay 
in completing negotiations, the Chile treaty fell into the Senate 
limbo created by Senator Rand Paul’s hold on tax treaties.345 
The ability of a single U.S. Senator to cause the U.S. tax treaty 
program to come to a halt is not intuitive. Under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the Senate must give advice and consent to the ratification of 
treaties, including tax treaties.346 That approval must be by “two 
thirds of the Senators present.”347 In general, treaties are reviewed 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee based on a technical 
analysis done by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and 
then voted on in a business meeting.348 Senators are then asked if 
they have any objections to the treaties being approved by “unani-
mous consent”—a process that avoids the need for debate on the 
Senate floor.349 This process had worked relatively smoothly for 
decades.350 However, it also allowed Rand Paul to hold up the tax 
                                                                                                             
 341 See Press Release, Chilean Tax Administration, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation News, MFN Clauses in Chilean Tax Treaties with Argentina, 
Australia, France, Sweden and Uruguay (July 11, 2019). 
 342 Robert Goulder, U.S. Enters Tax Treaty Negotiations with Chile, TAX 
NOTES TODAY INT’L (Jan, 25, 2000), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-
international/treaties/us-enters-tax-treaty-negotiations-chile/2000/01/25/1bwjk.  
 343 These changes were made in December 2009. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., TAX CO-OPERATION 2010: TOWARDS A LEVEL PLAYING 
FIELD 50 (2010), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/tax-co-operation-
2010_taxcoop-2010-en#page1. 
 344 See Chile-U.S. Convention, supra note 186. 
 345 Diane Ring, When International Tax Agreements Fail at Home: A U.S. Ex-
ample, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1185, 1198-99 (2016). 
 346 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 347 Id. 
 348 See About Us: Other, JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/other.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2019). 
 349 Ring, supra note 345, at 1196–97. 
 350 Treaties: A Historical Overview, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/ar-
tandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) 
(“During its first 200 years, the Senate approved more than 1,500 treaties and 
rejected only 21.”). 
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treaties for a considerable period as Senate floor time is a scarce 
commodity.351 
Finally, in the summer of 2019, Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell decided to move forward a number of tax agreements 
that had been pending for, in some cases, close to a decade.352 How-
ever, in the second piece of bad timing for Chile, there was a new 
wrinkle around changes that had been made to U.S. domestic law by 
the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.353 This law included a number of 
provisions that were potentially inconsistent with U.S. tax treaty ob-
ligations.354 In particular, there were questions regarding the Base 
Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (“BEAT”).355 Under the “later in time” 
principle, a statute can override an earlier treaty, and vice versa.356 
There is debate over whether the BEAT overrides the non-discrimi-
nation provisions of existing treaties.357 In any case, the Treasury 
Department obviously was nervous about the possibility that treaties 
that enter into force after the BEAT was enacted could override the 
BEAT.358 Accordingly, they asked Senate Democrats to enter a res-
ervation to pending treaties (including the treaty with Chile) to “clar-
ify” that the BEAT would apply under those treaties.359 Instead, 
Treasury’s request was made public.360 Four protocols to existing 
treaties that ostensibly do not present the issue moved forward and 
                                                                                                             
 351 See Ring, supra note 345, at 1197. 
 352 Jim Tankersley, Senate Approves Tax Treaties for First Time In Decade, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/business/tax-
treaties-vote.html. 
 353 Natalie Olivo, After Nearly 10 Years, Tax Treaties May Face More Delays, 
LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/1183525. 
 354 See H. David Rosenbloom & Fadi Shaheen, The TCJA and the Treaties, 
TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L 1057, 1057–58 (Sept. 9, 2019). 
 355 See H. David Rosenbloom & Fadi Shaheen, The BEAT and the Treaties, 
TAX NOTES INT’L 53, 53, 56 (Oct. 1, 2018). 
 356 Id. at 56 (“When an irreconcilable conflict is found, the provision that is 
later in time generally controls.”). 
 357 Id. at 59. 
 358 See Olivo, supra note 353. 
 359 See Letter from Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator, to Steven T. Mnuchin, 
Sec’y of the Treasury, Dep’t of the Treasury (June 11, 2019) (“All we know at 
this point is that the Department would like to see the reservation applied to the 
treaties with Chile, Hungary, and Poland.”). 
 360 Id. 
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were approved by the Senate.361 Three full treaties, which squarely 
present the issue, were consigned once again to limbo.362 Press re-
ports indicate that Senator McConnell’s decision to allocate floor 
time to the tax treaties might have been motivated by a potential 
investment in Kentucky by a Spanish company, and therefore a de-
sire to approve the pending protocol with Spain.363 This suggests 
that (a) no tax treaty will move forward until the Treasury Depart-
ment addresses the issue directly, through treaty provisions or pro-
tocols, and (b) future treaties should be presented in bundles that 
generate substantial interest in the business community (preferably 
benefitting projects in Kentucky). 
CONCLUSION 
The world is a complicated place. Countries have very different 
views of their national interests, and those views are more nuanced 
than outside observers can begin to understand. It is therefore folly 
to make general statements about what is in the interests of devel-
oping countries or of any subset of developing countries. 
What is clear is that, even looking only at Latin America, coun-
tries have different reasons for not having tax treaties with the 
United States. In relatively few cases has a treaty foundered solely 
over a desire by one state to have higher withholding rates or a more 
expansive host state exercise of taxing rights. In some cases, it has 
just been a matter of bad timing for a treaty that generally was con-
sistent with U.S. treaty policies. 
The good news is that it therefore should be possible for the 
United States to reach agreements with a number of LATAM coun-
tries where there is a significant bilateral economic relationship. 
However, it might be productive to focus on smaller countries that 
have already shown an interest in encouraging investment from the 
                                                                                                             
 361 See Tankersley, supra note 352 (noting that the agreements with Switzer-
land, Japan, Luxembourg, and Spain were all approved by the U.S. Senate). 
 362 Olivo, supra note 353 (explaining that the treaties with Chile, Poland, and 
Hungry are “unlikely to move through the Senate with the same relative ease” as 
the four protocols). 
 363 See Tankersley, supra note 352 (detailing how Spain-based Acerinox em-
ploys 1,500 workers in Kentucky). 
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United States rather than a “blockbuster” like Brazil, where substan-
tial barriers to an agreement remain. 
 
